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Abstract	  The	  United	  States	  has	  historically	  demonstrated	  a	  fervent	  interest	  in	  its	  public	   education	   system.	   Performance	   concerns	   have	   inundated	   the	  system	   for	   years,	   prompting	   overarching	   policy	   reforms	   that	   have	  received	  vast	  criticisms.	  This	  paper	  aims	  to	  highlight	  the	  link	  between	  these	   performance	   deficiencies	   and	   the	   nature	   in	   which	   public	  education	  in	  funded	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  in	  the	  process	  of	  doing	  so	  argues	   that	   this	   system	   is	   outdated	   and	   needs	   to	   be	   changed.	   Our	  results	   indicate	   that	   a	   strong	   relationship	   exists	   between	   school	  districts	  that	  rely	  more	  heavily	  on	  property	  tax	  revenue	  and	  academic	  achievement	  in	  the	  form	  of	  graduation	  rates	  and	  standardized	  English	  Language	  Arts	  exam	  scores.	  	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  
	   This	  empirical	  study	  explores	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  dependency	  on	  local	  property	   taxes	   for	   funding	  public	  school	  districts	   in	  New	  York	  State	  and	  academic	  achievement.	   Although	   the	   happenstance	   of	   drawing	   from	   local	   sources	   to	   fund	  education	   is	  present	  abroad,	   it	   is	   remarkably	  widespread	   inside	   the	  United	  States.	  The	   efficacy	   of	   the	   system	   has	   been	   challenged	   time	   and	   time	   again	   within	   state	  court	   systems,	   with	   plaintiffs	   arguing	   that	   it	   infringes	   on	   tax-­‐based	   fairness	   and	  equality	   of	   opportunities	   across	   districts.	   Yet,	   while	   the	   extensive	   usage	   of	   local	  funding	   has	   come	   under	   heavy	   scrutiny	   within	   education	   literature	   and	   court	  systems,	   federal	  policy	  regarding	   it	   is	  nonexistent.	  Hence	   this	  paper	  contends	   that	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the	   focus	   of	   federal	   policy	   regarding	   education	   reform	   has	   been	   misguided	   and	  needs	  to	  change.	  While	  policy	   implementations	  by	  the	   federal	  government	  such	  as	  the	  No	  Child	  Left	  Behind	  Act	  of	  2001	  and	  Race	   to	   the	  Top	  have	   overtly	   focused	   on	  administrative	   incentives	   to	   improve	   schools,	   the	   channels	   of	   these	   focuses	   are	  erroneous.	   The	   focus	   should	   instead	   be	   put	   on	  means	   that	   affect	   inputs,	   and	   how	  these	   means	   can	   affect	   incentive	   schemes	   of	   the	   agents	   in	   play,	   that	   is	   students,	  parents,	  and	  taxpayers.	  Of	  these	  means,	  we	  argue	  that	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  school	  districts	   are	   funded	   can	   be	   tied	   to	   their	   performance,	   which	   has	   allowed	  incongruous	   funding	   schemes	   to	   be	   a	   vehicle	   for	   creating	   academic	   achievement	  disparities	   that	   are	   evident	  not	   only	   in	  New	  York	   State,	   but	   across	   the	   country	   as	  well.	  	   Utilizing	   a	   new	   panel	   dataset	   comprising	   roughly	   650	   school	   districts	   in	   New	  York	  State	  for	  the	  years	  2005	  through	  2012,	  this	  paper	  aims	  to	  empirically	  estimate	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  property	  tax	  revenue	  and	  academic	  achievement,	  an	  aspect	  of	   the	  education	  production	   function	   that	  we	  argue	   is	  underemphasized	  by	  federal	  policy.	  We	  follow	  the	  example	  set	  by	  Mensah,	  Schoderbek,	  &	  Sahay	  (2013),	  a	  study	  which	  found	  the	  percentage	  of	  revenues	  generated	  by	  school	  districts	  in	  New	  Jersey	  that	  are	  derived	  from	  property	  taxes	  to	  have	  a	  significantly	  positive	  effect	  on	  student	  performance.	  As	  noted	   in	   their	  publication,	   “due	  to	   the	  high	  percentage	  of	  school	   district	   expenditures	   funded	   locally,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   variation	   in	   local	   taxes	  between	  districts,	  New	  Jersey	  provides	  an	  excellent	  backdrop	  to	  test	  our	  theory.”	  (p.	  2)	  Statistically,	  New	  York	  State’s	  educational	  funding	  system	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  New	  Jersey’s,	  exhibiting	  strong	  dependence	  on	  property	  taxes	  and	  high	  variation	  across	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districts.	  	  	   An	   important	   distinction	   to	   be	  made	   is	   that	   this	   paper	   attempts	   to	   expose	   the	  effect	  of	  property	  tax	  revenue	  on	  achievement,	  not	  income.	  While	  it	  may	  be	  a	  natural	  assumption	   that	   disparities	   between	   districts	   in	   terms	   of	   property	   tax	   revenue	  coincide	  with	   the	  distribution	  of	  household	   income,	   this	   is	  not	  always	   the	  case.	   In	  many	  cases,	   richer	  districts	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	  high	  property	  values	  and	  vice	  versa	   (Kenyon,	   2007).	   The	   effect	   investigated	   is	   more	   indicative	   of	   incentive	  schemes	   corresponding	   to	   out-­‐of-­‐pocket	   spending	   on	   property	   taxes	   that	   directly	  contribute	  to	  the	  funding	  of	  public	  schools.	  We	  argue	  that	  taxpayers	  of	  districts	  with	  higher	  property	  taxes	  are	  more	  concerned	  with	  how	  their	  money	  is	  spent,	  leading	  to	  active	   engagement	   in	   school	   board	   meetings	   and	   procedures,	   which	   benefits	   the	  quality	   of	   education	   that	   students	   achieve.	   Conversely,	   districts	   that	   rely	   more	  heavily	  on	  state	  and	  federal	  revenue	  contain	  taxpayers	  that	  are	  either	  unconcerned	  or	   disillusioned	   with	   the	   process,	   as	   their	   out-­‐of-­‐pocket	   expense	   has	   a	   smaller	  contribution	   to	   the	   education	   production	   function.	   Although	   the	   coincidence	   of	  these	  correlations	  with	  the	  income	  distribution	  is	  relevant	  to	  our	  discussion,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  research	  endeavor	  of	  this	  study.	  	   Our	   primary	   results	   indicate	   a	   consistent	   relationship	   between	   property	   tax	  revenue	  and	  graduation	  rates	  and	  ELA	  test	  scores,	  and	  a	   less	  uniform	  relationship	  between	  the	  former	  and	  Math	  scores.	  These	  results	  are	  robust	  to	  a	  time	  fixed	  effects	  model	  and	  a	  random	  effects	  model,	  but	  not	  to	  a	  time	  and	  district	  fixed	  effects	  model.	  We	  attribute	  the	  latter	  inconsistency	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  within-­‐district	  variation	  in	  funding	  and	   achievement	   over	   time,	   and	   therefore	   assert	   and	   interpret	   the	   former	   results	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with	  greater	  conviction.	  	   The	   rest	   of	   this	   paper	   is	   organized	   as	   follows.	   The	   next	   section	   discusses	   the	  conceptual	   framework	  of	   federal	  policy	  regarding	  education,	  and	  highlights	  why	   it	  has	   been	   considered	   ineffective.	   It	   then	   goes	   on	   to	   discuss	   school	   district	   finance,	  touching	  on	  how	  state	   legislatures	  and	  courts	  have	  attempted	  to	  address	   issues	  of	  fairness	  and	  equality	  in	  property	  tax	  funding.	  Section	  3	  outlines	  the	  specification	  of	  our	  empirical	  model.	  Section	  4	  discusses	  our	  data	  sources	  and	  descriptive	  statistics.	  Section	   5	   summarizes	   our	   different	   modeling	   approaches	   and	   presents	   detailed	  results,	   followed	   by	   our	   conclusions	   and	   policy	   recommendation	   in	   Section	   6.	  Section	  7	  contains	  works	  cited,	  Appendix	   I	  presents	   tables	  described	   in	   the	  paper,	  and	  Appendix	  II	  presents	  graphs.	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2.	  Theory	  
2.	  1.	   Theoretical	  Underpinnings	  of	  Education	  Policy	  
	   Accountability	   has	   been	   a	   hallmark	   feature	   of	   policy	   regarding	   high	   school	  achievement	   in	   the	   United	   States	   since	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   Elementary	   and	  Secondary	  Education	  Act	  of	  1965.	  Following	   its	   inception,	   it	  has	  been	  adapted	  and	  reauthorized	   several	   times,	   culminating	   in	   the	   No	   Child	   Left	   Behind	   Act	   of	   2001	  which	   called	   for	   more	   accountability	   regarding	   test	   scores	   by	   eliciting	   hard	  sanctions	   or	   rewards	   for	   schools	   that	   failed	   or	   passed	   statewide	   standards.	   By	  sanctioning	  schools	  that	  failed	  to	  reach	  a	  benchmark	  for	  achievement	  within	  a	  given	  school	  year	  (labeled	  Adequate	  Yearly	  Progress,	  or	  AYP),	  No	  Child	  Left	  Behind	  hoped	  to	  incentivize	  gains	  in	  academic	  performance,	  with	  a	  goal	  of	  100	  percent	  proficiency	  amongst	  students	  by	  2014.	  Needless	  to	  say	  this	  goal	  has	  not	  been	  reached,	  resulting	  in	  43	   states,	   the	  District	  of	  Columbia	  and	  Puerto	  Rico	  being	  approved	   for	  waivers	  granting	   flexibility	   from	   the	   sanctions	   administered	   for	   failing	   to	   reach	   AYP	   (U.S.	  Department	  of	  Education,	  2012).	  The	  program	  has	  received	  much	  criticism	  since	  its	  inception,	  coming	  under	  intense	  scrutiny	  concerning	  its	  effectiveness.	  Yet,	  amongst	  all	  the	  qualms,	  accountability	  remains	  prevalent	  across	  the	  country,	  with	  Race	  to	  the	  Top,	   a	   contest-­‐based	   program	   introduced	   in	   2009	   currently	   in	   effect,	   and	   a	   few	  states	   still	   adhering	   to	   the	   restrictions	   of	   No	   Child	   Left	   Behind.	   So	   why	   is	   it	   that	  accountability	  policies	  remain	  at	  the	  core	  of	  our	  education	  agenda,	  and	  why	  are	  they	  so	  ineffective?	  
	   From	  an	  economic	  standpoint,	  the	  insight	  behind	  accountability	  policies	  is	  clear.	  If	   the	   aim	   were	   to	   increase	   performance	   and	   productivity	   from	   the	   educational	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sector	   of	   our	   economy,	   then	   the	   first	   lines	   of	   thinking	  would	   be	   competition	   and	  incentives.	   It	  works	   in	   the	  other	  sectors:	  by	  handing	  out	  grants	  and	  tax	  breaks	   for	  firms	  that	  surpass	  production	  and	  efficiency	  goals,	  we	  experience	  positive	  responses	  in	   both	   areas.	   However,	   the	   education	   sector	   is	   more	   complex.	   “Output”	   in	   the	  education	  sector	  is	  very	  ambiguous	  (Fiva	  &	  Rønning,	  2008;	  Mensah	  et	  al.,	  2013);	  we	  should	   not	   expect	   the	   same	   responses	   to	   incentives,	   and	   increased	   competition	  won’t	   necessarily	   bring	   out	   the	   same	   results.	   The	  primary	   reason	   for	   this	   is	  what	  Dee	   &	   Jacob	   (2010)	   refer	   to	   as	   a	   principal-­‐agent	   problem,	   in	   that	   those	   who	   are	  responsible	   for	   enacting	   and	   enforcing	   the	   policy	   (legislators	   and	   administrators)	  have	   interests	   that	   are	  misaligned	  with	   the	   agents	   at	   play	   (students,	   parents,	   and	  taxpayers).	  Thus,	  not	  only	  is	  it	  evident	  that	  the	  agents’	  response	  to	  the	  policy	  will	  be	  other	  than	  expected,	  but	  since	  interests	  are	  heterogeneous	  administrators	  may	  also	  “respond	   to	   accountability	   policies	   in	   unintentionally	   narrow	   or	   even	  counterproductive	  ways,”	  (Dee	  &	  Jacob,	  2010,	  p.	  152).	  This	  can	  shift	  the	  focus	  from	  students	  to	  teachers	  assuming	  that	  if	  we	  want	  educational	  performance	  to	  improve,	  we	  must	  first	  make	  sure	  that	  those	  who	  are	  educating	  students	  provide	  the	  correct	  methods	  and	  hold	  the	  same	  interests	  as	  those	  of	  taxpayers,	  parents,	  and	  legislators.	  The	   issue	   of	   teacher	   incentives	   comes	   to	   light,	   of	   which	   a	   large	   literature	   exists	  concerning	  their	  effects	  on	  academic	  achievement	  (Clotfelter,	  Ladd,	  &	  Vigdor,	  2006;	  Fryer,	  2011;	  Goldhaber	  &	  Brewer,	  2000).	  
	   The	  principal-­‐agent	  problem	  is	  still	  apparent,	  as	  naturally	  the	  interests	  of	  parents	  and	  students	  are	  not	  necessarily	  aligned	  with	  those	  of	  teachers,	  nor	  are	  they	  always	  conveyed	   accurately.	   The	   only	   common	   ground	   we	   can	   be	   sure	   of	   is	   the	   most	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obvious;	   legislators,	   administrators,	   teachers,	   and	   parents	   all	   want	   the	   same	  outcome:	   higher	   educational	   performance.	   However	   only	   administrators	   and	  legislators	  control	  the	  inputs,	  and	  as	  much	  as	  we	  assume	  parents	  and	  students	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  those	  inputs,	  we	  cannot	  even	  be	  sure	  how	  many	  of	   them	   are	   engaged	   enough	   to	   make	   their	   stance	   visible.	   The	   problem	   becomes	  more	  complex.	  Firstly,	  how	  do	  we	  obtain	  an	  outcome	  when	  interests	  are	  misaligned	  and	  misrepresented?	   	   Secondly,	   from	   the	   administrator’s	   perspective,	   how	   do	  we	  obtain	   an	   outcome	   when	   interests	   are	   misaligned	   and	   misrepresented,	   and	   the	  agents	  in	  question	  are	  potentially	  disengaged?	  
	   The	   solution	   to	   these	   questions	   and	   the	   problem	   at	   hand	   lies	  within	   incentive	  channels,	  however	  the	  difficulty	  with	  the	  matter	  resides	  in	  how	  we	  decide	  to	  affect	  them.	  The	   incentives	   of	   students,	   administrators,	   teachers,	   parents,	   and	   taxpayers	  all	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  accurately	  and	  fairly	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  an	  optimal	  result.	  While	  students	  are	  the	  primary	  agents	  at	  play	  here,	  affecting	  their	  incentives	  can	  be	  difficult	  and	  impractical.	  The	  only	  direct	  and	  well-­‐documented	  attempt	  at	  this	  was	  performed	  by	  Fryer	  (2010),	  who	  attempted	  to	  incentivize	  educational	  outcomes	  by	  offering	   monetary	   rewards	   to	   students.	   His	   study	   focused	   on	   two	   different	  approaches,	  which	  were	  either	  input	  or	  output	  based.	  The	  input	  approach	  consisted	  of	   incentivizing	   skills,	   such	   as	   reading,	   whereas	   the	   output	   approach	   applied	   to	  outcomes	  of	   the	  education	  production	   function,	   i.e.	   grades	  and	   test	   scores.	   Fryer’s	  results	   revealed	   that	   techniques	   incentivizing	   inputs	   were	   superior	   to	   that	   of	  outputs,	  as	  monetary	  rewards	   for	  reading	  books	  had	  greater	  effects	  on	  test	  scores	  than	  direct	  monetary	  rewards	  for	  test	  scores	  did.	  Although	  these	  findings	  certainly	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do	  not	  warrant	  paying	  students	  to	  develop	  reading	  skills,	   they	  can	  help	  to	   identify	  the	  correct	  channel	  through	  which	  incentives	  can	  be	  positively	  influenced.	  	  
	   The	   input	   versus	   output	   problem	   also	   helps	   us	   to	   better	   understand	   the	  disengagement	  problem	  and	  how	  students	  react	  to	  policy,	  and	  how	  we	  can	  improve	  the	  way	   they	  become	  educated.	  Among	  other	   interpretations	  of	  Fryer’s	   results,	  he	  notes	   that	   students	   “do	   not	   understand	   the	   educational	   production	   function	   and,	  thus,	  lack	  the	  know-­‐how	  to	  translate	  their	  excitement	  about	  the	  incentive	  structure	  into	  measurable	  output,“	  (Fryer,	  2010,	  p.	  7).	   	  This	  implies	  that	  students	  of	  interest,	  i.e.	   failing	   students	   or	   “bubble”	   students	   in	   the	   grades	   sampled,	   lack	   the	   ability	   to	  improve	  their	  grades,	  even	  with	  directly	  imposed	  incentives.	  This	  implies	  that	  input	  incentives	  would	  be	  more	  effective,	  for	  it	  suggests	  a	  structural	  problem	  rather	  than	  an	  engagement	  problem.	  This	  approach	  is	  opposite	  to	  that	  of	  accountability	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  No	  Child	  Left	  Behind,	  which	  is	  an	  output-­‐based	  policy.	  	  
	   By	   focusing	   on	   test	   scores,	   No	   Child	   Left	   Behind	   influenced	   the	   incentives	   of	  educators,	   not	   students.	   By	   design,	   sanctions	   have	   a	   more	   pronounced	   effect	   on	  administrators	  in	  the	  form	  of	  budget	  cuts,	  reorganization	  requirements,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  closure	  of	  schools.	   In	  targeting	  educators	  rather	  than	  students,	  No	  Child	  Left	  Behind	   provoked	   distortions	   in	   motivational	   methods,	   as	   proficient	   test	   scores	  became	   necessary	   to	   satiate	   the	   needs	   of	   administrators	   and	   teachers.	   Concerns	  over	  teaching	  to	  the	  test	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  AYP	  status	  has	  been	  well	  documented	  in	  the	  literature	  (Dee	  &	  Jacob,	  2010;	  Menken,	  2006;	  Cawelti,	  2006)	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  administrative	  cheating	   in	   the	  years	   following	   the	   introduction	  of	  No	  Child	  Left	  Behind	   have	   also	   been	   exposed	   (Jacob	   &	   Levitt,	   2003;	   Amrein-­‐Beardsley,	   2009).	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Although	   it	   is	   rash	   to	   assume	   that	   all	   testing	   during	   the	   NCLB	   era	   succumbed	   to	  these	  pernicious	  techniques	  and	  should	  therefore	  be	  disregarded,	  it	  is	  nevertheless	  clear	  that	  incentivizing	  educators	  has	  its	  drawbacks.	  	  
	   In	  order	  to	  prevent	  these	  insular	  approaches	  from	  becoming	  widespread	  teacher	  credentials	  and	  techniques	  should	  be	  monitored	  closely.	  There	  have	  been	  multiple	  empirical	   studies	   performed	   on	   the	   correlation	   between	   teacher	   credentials	   and	  student	   performance	   (Clotfelter,	   Ladd,	   &	   Vigdor,	   2006;	   Kane,	   Rockoff,	   &	   Staiger,	  2007;	  Goldhaber	  &	  Brewer,	  2000)	  some	  of	  which	  find	  positive	  effects,	  while	  others	  find	  minimal	  effects	  on	  student	  performance.	  There	   is	  an	  emphasis	  on	  experience;	  many	   studies	   find	   that	   while	   training,	   credentials,	   and	   performance	   amongst	  teachers	   is	   spuriously	   correlated	   with	   student	   performance,	   a	   learning	   curve	   for	  teaching	   is	  present,	   in	  that	  after	  the	   first	   few	  years	  teachers	  experience	  significant	  gains	   in	   student	   performance	   (Kane,	   Rockoff,	   &	   Staiger,	   2007),	   and	  modest	   gains	  thereafter	  (Harris	  &	  Sass,	  2011).	  This	  can	  also	  speak	  to	  the	  incentives	  of	  teachers,	  in	  that	   after	   a	   probationary	   period	   in	   which	   their	   job	   security	  may	   feel	   threatened,	  increased	   job	   security	   can	   improve	   the	   quality	   of	   their	   teaching.	   Reback,	   Rockoff,	  and	  Schwartz	  (2013)	  find	  that	  decreased	  job	  security	  can	  lead	  to	  teachers	  expecting	  to	   leave	   the	   profession	   soon,	  which	   decreases	   their	   incentives	   to	   teach	  well.	   This	  channel	  is	  complicated	  even	  further	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  tenure,	  as	  many	  argue	  that	  once	   a	   teacher	   receives	   tenure	   their	   incentives	   to	   teach	   at	   a	   high	   caliber	   can	  decrease	  (Goldhaber	  &	  Hansen,	  2010).	  
	   The	  evidence	  provided	   from	  Fryer	   (2010),	  numerous	   studies	   regarding	   teacher	  incentives	  (Fryer,	  2011;	  Ahn,	  2013;	  Figlio	  &	  Kenny,	  2007),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  occurrence	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of	  imprudent	  practices	  by	  administrators	  tell	  us	  how	  tricky	  of	  an	  issue	  education	  is,	  and	  why	  it	  is	  so	  difficult	  to	  solve.	  	  From	  a	  policy	  standpoint,	  education	  reform	  is	  not	  reactive	   to	   traditional	   economic	   thought,	   and	   is	   unlike	   any	   other	   sector	   of	   the	  economy.	   Findings	   on	   teacher	   incentives	   have	   found	   the	   effects	   on	   student	  performance	  to	  be	  both	  minimal	  or	  absent	  (Fryer,	  2011),	  as	  well	  as	  significant	  (Ahn,	  2013).	  Heterogeneous	  students	  and	  teachers	  call	  for	  a	  policy	  that	  applies	  to	  students	  and	  teachers	  with	  vastly	  different	  needs.	  The	  disengagement	  problem	  exists	  in	  both	  groups,	  which	   calls	   for	   incentive-­‐based	   reform.	   Innate	  quality	  deficiencies	   exist	   in	  both	   groups,	   which	   calls	   for	   comprehensive	   reform	   in	   structural	   and	   methodical	  approaches,	  of	  which	  the	  best	  route	  is	  unknown.	  This	  lack	  of	  information	  naturally	  leads	  to	  reform	  policy	  that	  is	  both	  insufficient	  and	  ineffective.	  The	  desire	  to	  correct	  both	  core	  problems	  within	  one	  channel	  of	  implementation	  has	  led	  policymakers	  to	  accountability.	  	   Accountability	   targets	   the	   incentives	   of	   administrators,	   hoping	   that	   in	   turn	   the	  incentives	  of	   students	  and	   teachers	  will	  be	  positively	   influenced.	   In	  describing	   the	  ambiguity	   in	   application	   that	   arises	   from	   this	   concentration,	  we	   have	   argued	   that	  the	   incentive	   channels	   of	   administrators,	   teachers,	   and	   students	   are	   complex	   and	  difficult	   to	   influence	   positively	   via	   accountability	   and	   legislation	   as	   a	   whole.	   This	  leaves	  us	  with	  the	  incentive	  channels	  of	  parents	  and	  taxpayers,	  who	  at	  first	  glance	  seem	   exogenous	   to	   the	   education	   production	   function,	   and	   are	   not	   accounted	   for	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  accountability.	  To	  affect	  the	  incentives	  of	  these	  groups,	  an	  input	   based	   approach	   must	   be	   taken,	   where	   factors	   outside	   the	   realm	   of	   those	  controlled	  by	  administrators	  are	  considered.	  	  Smaller-­‐scaled	  policies	  and	  literature	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that	  delves	  into	  these	  factors	  have	  considered	  demographics	  (Lillydahl,	  1990;	  Glick	  &	   White,	   2003;	   Caldas	   &	   Bankston,	   1997),	   class	   size	   (Nye,	   Hedges,	   &	  Konstantopoulos,	   2000),	   funding,	   and	   teacher	   quality	   as	   determinants	   of	   quality	  deficiencies	   of	   students.	   A	   focus	   on	   inputs	   rather	   than	   that	   of	   outputs	   considers	  variables	   that	   are	   either	   governed	   by	   policy	   and	   legislation	   or	   endogenous	   to	   the	  make	  up	  of	  the	  student	  body	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Statistics	  such	  as	  race,	  household	  income	  level,	   and	   gender	   are	   variables	   that	   while	   potentially	   significant,	   are	   largely	  invariant.	  To	  find	  that	  race	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  factors	  in	  defining	  academic	  achievement	  gaps	  would	  be	  a	  flaccid	  discovery	  for	  policy	  implications,	  and	  would	  do	  little	   to	   distinguish	   important	   differences	   of	   the	   United	   States’	   public	   education	  system	  to	  that	  of	  a	  more	  successful	  education	  institution.	  	  	   This	  leads	  contributors	  to	  the	  education	  reform	  literature	  to	  focus	  on	  inputs	  and	  means	   that	   affect	   inputs	   that	   are	   not	   only	   unique	   to	   our	   domestic	   education	  production	   function	  but	   that	   are	   also	  potentially	  mutable.	   Factors	   such	  as	   teacher	  qualities,	  curriculums,	  and	  education	  finance	  fit	  this	  archetype,	  with	  the	  latter	  being	  particularly	  unique	  to	  the	  United	  States’	  education	  system.	  The	  domestic	  approach	  of	  drawing	  immense	  proportions	  of	  funds	  from	  locality	  based	  tax	  revenue	  is	  largely	  unparalleled	  by	  other	  countries,	  especially	  those	  which	  rank	  significantly	  higher	  in	  terms	  of	  education	  quality	  than	  the	  United	  States.	  Averting	  focus	  to	  the	  incentives	  of	  parents	  and	  taxpayers	  makes	  school	  finance	  of	  particular	  interest,	  as	  it	  can	  act	  as	  a	  direct	   linkage	   between	   the	   interests	   of	   legislators	   (i.e.	   improving	   student	  performance)	  and	  the	  interests	  of	  parents	  and	  taxpayers	  (i.e.	  acknowledgment	  that	  their	   taxes	   are	   being	   utilized	   efficiently	   and	   effectively).	   This	   relationship	   is	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characterized	   by	   monetary	   incentives	   influencing	   inputs	   to	   the	   education	  production	  function;	  taxpayers	  and	  parents	  have	  budgetary	  stakes	  in	  the	  actions	  of	  administrators,	   and	   can	   take	   their	   money	   elsewhere	   if	   they	   are	   dissatisfied.	   It	  resembles	  Tiebout’s	  model	  of	  the	  public	  good	  (Tiebout,	  1956),	  in	  which	  an	  efficient	  provision	  of	  a	  public	  good	  can	  exist	  given	  certain	  assumptions,	  one	  of	  which	  being	  that	  consumers	  (in	  this	  case	  taxpayers)	  are	  perfectly	  mobile.	  By	  voting	  “with	  their	  feet”,	   consumers	  promote	   efficiency	  by	   revealing	   their	   preferences	   and	  moving	   to	  the	  district	  that	  suits	  their	  needs	  the	  best.	  If	  the	  assumptions	  of	  the	  Tiebout	  model	  were	  satisfied	  in	  our	  finance	  system,	  perhaps	  we	  could	  expect	  similar	  results.	  	   However,	  the	  issue	  at	  hand	  is	  that	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  parents	  and	  taxpayers	  have	  the	  same	   type	   of	   interests,	   yet	   some	   districts	   have	   financial	   leverage	   to	   affect	  administrative	  decisions	   and	   some	  do	  not.	  This	  problem	   is	   exacerbated	  by	   zoning	  laws	  that	  have	  restricted	  mobility	   from	  property	  tax	  poor	  districts	   to	  property	  tax	  rich	  districts.	  These	  structural	  deficiencies	  make	  	  “voting	  with	  the	  feet”	  nonexistent,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  public	  good	  (education)	  is	  not	  efficient,	  nor	  is	  it	  equitable.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  are	  twofold.	  Firstly,	  richer	  districts	  are	  able	  to	  better	  fund	  their	  schools	  with	  lower	  tax	  rates	  than	  poorer	  districts.	  Secondly,	  the	  existence	  of	  certain	  districts	  relying	  more	  heavily	  on	  property	  tax	  revenue	  than	  other	  districts	  has	  increased	  the	  quality	  of	  those	  schools	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  others.	  The	  effect	  of	  this	  disparity	  is	  to	  be	  empirically	  investigated	  later	  on	  in	  this	  paper.	  	  	   The	   focus	   of	   this	   paper	   hereafter	   will	   be	   education	   finance	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   academic	  performance.	   The	   next	   section	   will	   describe	   the	   historical	   underpinnings	   of	   the	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educational	  finance	  system	  in	  the	  United	  States	  as	  well	  as	  the	  issues	  that	   litigation	  and	  policy	  implementations	  have	  attempted	  to	  address.	  
2.2.	   Education	  Finance	  	   A	   lack	  of	   federal	  guidance	  regarding	   the	   funding	  of	  public	  schools,	  which	  stems	  from	   the	   neglect	   of	   education	   in	   the	   Constitution,	   has	   left	   the	   parameters	   of	  educational	   finance	   protocol	   up	   to	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   legislative	   and	   judicial	  processes	  for	  each	  respective	  state.	  Most	  states	  that	  have	  considered	  a	  restructuring	  of	  education	  finance	  have	  had	  landmark	  court	  cases	  determining	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  systems	   in	   place.	   These	   cases	   have	   historically	   covered	  multiple	   areas	   of	   finance	  efficacy,	  with	   two	   typical	   objectives	   at	   stake:	   promoting	   fairness	   to	   both	   students	  and	   taxpayers.	  There	  are	  approaches	   that	  aim	   to	  ensure	   that	  an	  education	  system	  provides	   an	   equal	   standard	  of	   education	   across	  districts,	   an	   adequate	   standard	  of	  education,	  and	  there	  have	  been	  attempts	  to	  ensure	  that	  increases	  in	  tax-­‐rates	  incur	  the	   same	   impact	   on	   per-­‐pupil	   revenues	   in	   every	   district	   (Yinger,	   2004).	   The	  interests	  of	  those	  in	  favor	  of	  fairness	  to	  students	  versus	  those	  in	  favor	  of	  tax-­‐payers	  are	  sometimes	  misaligned,	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  this	  misalignment	  provides	  not	  only	  for	   heterogeneous	   funding	   approaches	   across	   states,	   but	   also	   for	   funding	  approaches	  that	  are	  not	  Pareto	  efficient.	  	  	  	   Although	   schools	   receive	   funding	   from	   various	   institutions,	   and	   while	   the	  composition	  of	   these	   revenues	  differ	   state	   to	   state,	   all	   states	  utilize	   local	  property	  taxation	  as	  a	  source	  of	  revenue	  for	  schools	  (Arocho,	  2014).	  Naturally,	   this	   leads	  to	  large	   disparities	   in	   per-­‐pupil	   funding	   across	   districts.	   “This	   system	   purportedly	  maintains	   local	   control	   over	   education,	   but	   as	   the	   income	   gap	   continues	   to	   grow,	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funding	  schools	  with	  local	  property	  taxes	  has	  created	  severe	  disparities	  in	  per-­‐pupil	  funding	   between	   high-­‐property-­‐value	   school	   districts	   and	   low-­‐property-­‐value	  school	  districts.”	  (Arocho,	  2014,	  p.	  1481)	  	  Taking	  into	  account	  the	  increasing	  wealth-­‐gap	  in	  the	  United	  States	  sees	  these	  disparities	  accentuated.	  	  	   Historically	  speaking,	   litigation	  regarding	   this	  subject	  started	  with	   the	  Supreme	  Court	   case	   Brown	   vs.	   Board	   of	   Education	   of	   Topeka	   (1954),	   which	   ruled	   that	  segregated	   schools	   were	   unconstitutional	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   a	   separate	   but	   equal	  statute	   discriminated	   against	   blacks,	   and	   therefore	   violated	   the	   equal	   protection	  clause	  of	  the	  Constitution	  (Kenyon,	  2007,	  p.	  8).	  This	  case	  signified	  the	  importance	  of	  education	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  government,	  emphasizing	  equality	  among	  schools.	  The	  implications	   of	   Brown	   offer	   more	   insight	   than	   application	   in	   education	   reform	  however,	   as	   attempts	   to	   achieve	   finance	   equality	   among	   schools	   through	   federal	  litigation	   are	   often	   impeded	   by	   the	   lack	   of	   language	   regarding	   education	   in	   the	  Constitution.	   Thus	   litigation	  within	   state	   court	   systems	  has	   been	  more	   successful.	  Beginning	   in	   the	   late	  1960’s,	   numerous	   court	   cases	   sprang	  up	   that	   challenged	   the	  constitutionality	   of	   funding	   approaches,	   arguing	   that	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	   system	  educational	   needs	   of	   students	   were	   not	   being	   met	   adequately	   across	   districts	  (McInis	  vs.	  Shapiro	  1968;	  Burrus	  vs.	  Wilkerson	  1969).	  These	  cases	  were	  unsuccessful	  both	  in	  local	  courts	  and	  in	  appeals	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  largely	  because	  the	  court	  felt	  that	  discernment	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  funds	  that	  best	  accommodates	  students	  is	  a	  value	  judgment	  that	  was	  better	  suited	  for	  the	  legislature	  (Minorini	  &	  Sugarman,	  1999).	  A	  more	  successful	  wave	  of	  litigation	  followed	  McInis	  and	  Burrus,	  of	  which	  the	  focus	   was	   equality.	   The	   disparity	   between	   per-­‐pupil	   funding	   across	   districts	   was	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plainly	   evident,	   and	   the	   reason	   for	   this	   was	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   distribution	   of	  property	  values.	   John	  Coons,	  a	  trailblazer	  of	   this	  movement,	  noted	  the	  significance	  of	   the	   proportion	   of	   tax-­‐rates	   to	   per-­‐pupil	   revenue,	   which	   revealed	   that	   poverty-­‐stricken	   districts	   often	   have	   higher	   tax	   rates	   but	   lower	   per-­‐pupil	   revenues	   in	  comparison	   to	  wealthier	  districts.	   	  Not	  only	  does	   this	   result	   in	   inequality	  amongst	  the	  availability	  of	  financial	  resources	  to	  schools,	  but	  it	  also	  implies	  that	  schools	  are	  not	  able	  to	  allocate	  the	  correct	  amount	  of	  funds	  that	  they	  believe	  is	  appropriate	  for	  meeting	   the	   educational	   needs	   of	   student	   (Minorini	   &	   Sugarman,	   1999).	   Hence,	  Coons	   and	   his	   colleagues	   argued	   that	   property	   tax	   based	   revenue	   systems	   went	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  wealth	  discrimination,	  which	  was	  unconstitutional.	  Two	  cases	  of	  note	   regarding	   this	   school	   of	   thought	   are	   Serrano	   vs.	   Priest	   (California	   Supreme	  Court,	   1971)	   and	   San	   Antonio	   Independent	   School	   District	   vs.	   Rodriguez	   (Lower	  Texas	   court	   ruling	   later	   appealed	   to	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	   1973).	   	   Rodriguez	   set	   a	  precedent	   for	   federal	   cases	   on	   the	   subject	   when	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	   in	   a	   5-­‐4	  decision,	   ruled	   that	   education	   is	   not	   a	   fundamental	   right	   in	   the	   Constitution,	  curtailing	  any	   future	  attempts	   to	   contest	  property	   tax	   funding	  at	   the	   federal	   level.	  Two	  years	  prior,	   the	  California	  Supreme	  court	  had	  ruled	  that	  their	   funding	  system	  was	   unconstitutional	   by	   violating	   equal	   protection	   clauses	   in	   the	   California	  constitution	   as	  well	   as	   the	   federal	   constitution.	   Since	   this	   case	  was	   adjudicated	   at	  the	  state	  level,	  the	  ruling	  in	  Rodriguez	  did	  not	  reverse	  it.	  	  	   “We	  have	  determined	  that	  this	  funding	  scheme	  invidiously	  discriminates	  against	  	   the	   poor	   because	   it	   makes	   the	   quality	   of	   a	   child's	   education	   a	   function	   of	   the	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   wealth	  of	  his	  parents	  and	  neighbors.	  Recognizing	  as	  we	  must	  that	  the	  right	  to	  an	  	   education	   in	   our	   public	   schools	   is	   a	   fundamental	   interest	   which	   cannot	   be	  	   conditioned	  on	  wealth,	  we	  can	  discern	  no	  compelling	  	  state	   purpose	   necessitating	  	   the	   present	   method	   of	   financing.	   We	   have	   concluded,	   therefore,	   that	   such	   a	  	   system	  cannot	  withstand	  constitutional	  challenge	  and	  must	  fall	  before	  the	  equal	  	   protection	  clause.”	  (Serrano	  v.	  Priest,	  1971)	  	   	  	   Amongst	   other	   legislation	   and	   public	   opinions,	   this	   decision	   led	   to	   “squeeze	  formulas”	   being	   enacted	   in	   California,	   which	   attempted	   to	   limit	   district	   parity	   by	  differentiating	   inflation	   rates	   for	   rich	   and	  poor	   districts,	   hoping	   to	   bridge	   funding	  gaps	  between	  them	  over	  time.	  Rising	  property	  values,	  along	  with	  further	  legislative	  attempts	  to	  redistribute	  property	  tax	  revenues	   from	  rich	  districts	   to	  poor	  districts	  led	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  Proposition	  13,	  which	  limited	  statewide	  property	  taxes	  to	  one	  percent	   of	   assessed	   value	   (Timar,	   2006).	   This	   necessitated	   further	   state	  involvement	   in	   funding	   public	   schools,	   and	   over	   time	   decreased	   California’s	  dependence	   on	   the	   property	   tax	   as	   a	   funding	   mechanism	   for	   public	   school	  education.	   Whether	   or	   not	   this	   has	   had	   an	   effect	   on	   academic	   achievement	   in	  California	   is	  uncertain,	  however	  as	  Kenyon	  (2007)	  claims,	   “California’s	   test	  scores,	  which	   were	   equal	   to	   the	   United	   States’	   average	   prior	   to	   the	   late	   1970s,	   are	   now	  among	   the	   lowest	   …	   Although	   Proposition	   13	   remains	   popular	   with	   voters,	  California’s	  centralized	  system	  of	  school	  funding	  and	  governance	  gets	  low	  ratings.”	  (p.	   17)	   Hence,	   there	   exists	   an	   equity-­‐versus-­‐efficiency	   problem	   within	   education	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finances;	  locality	  based	  funding	  approaches	  appear	  more	  efficient,	  but	  state	  funding	  is	  more	  equitable.	  	   Serrano	  managed	   to	   set	   a	   precedent	   for	   challenging	   school	   finance	   systems	   in	  state	   courts	   nationwide.	   Between	   1971	   and	   present	   day	   37	   states	   have	   had	   the	  constitutionality	  of	  their	  systems	  of	  education	  funding	  challenged,	  with	  25	  of	  those	  states	   deeming	   them	   unconstitutional	   (Berry,	   2007).	   Although	   Serrano	   proved	  successful	  through	  many	  revalidations,	  in	  general	  attempts	  at	  restructuring	  funding	  systems	  through	  litigation	  on	  grounds	  of	  equality	  arguments	  had	  less	  success.	  This	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  reappearance	  of	  the	  adequacy	  platform	  of	  the	  late	  1960s,	  spearheaded	  by	  the	  case	  of	  Rose	  vs.	  Council	  for	  Better	  Education	  Inc.,	  in	  which	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Kentucky	  ruled	  that	  the	  State	  of	  Kentucky’s	  school	  system	  was,	  “constitutionally	  deficient,”	   in	   that	   the	   Kentucky	   General	   Assembly	   did	   not	   comply	   with	   its	  “constitutional	   mandate,”	   to	   "provide	   an	   efficient	   system	   of	   common	   schools	  throughout	  the	  state,”	  (Rose	  vs.	  Council	  for	  Better	  Education	  Inc.,	  1989).	  These	  cases	  were	  more	   successful,	   for	   they	   asserted	   that	   the	   State	  must	   provide	   an	   adequate	  education	   for	   all	   students,	   which	   fell	   in	   line	   with	   language	   of	   many	   State	  Constitutions	  (Kenyon,	  2007,	  p.	  10).	  	  	   Equality	  and	  adequacy	  suits	  have	  littered	  the	  litigation	  history	  of	  New	  York	  State	  as	  well.	   In	  1982,	  Levittown	  vs.	  Nyquist	  addressed	   the	   issue	  of	  property	   tax	   funding	  inequalities,	  with	  the	  closing	  statement	  claiming	  that	  the	  system	  did	  not	  “violate	  the	  equal	   protection	   clause	   of	   either	   the	   Federal	   or	   the	   State	   Constitution	   nor	   is	   it	  unconstitutional	   under	   the	   education	   article	   of	   our	   State	  Constitution,”	   (Levittown	  
vs.	   Nyquist,	   1982).	  This	   was	   consistent	   with	   the	   ruling	   from	   Rodriguez,	   and	   set	   a	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similar	   type	   of	   precedent	   for	   New	   York	   State	   court	   rulings	   based	   on	   funding	  equality.	  	  The	  Campaign	  for	  Fiscal	  Equity	  put	  forth	  the	  adequacy	  argument	  in	  a	  suit	  against	  the	  State	  of	  New	  York,	  asserting	  that	  the	  State’s	  financing	  system	  was	  failing	  to	   provide	   “public	   school	   students	   in	   the	   City	   of	   New	   York	   …	   an	   opportunity	   to	  obtain	  a	  sound	  basic	  education	  as	  required	  by	  the	  State	  Constitution,”	  (CFE	  vs.	  State	  
of	   New	   York,	   1995).	   This	   ruling	   has	   consequently	   culminated	   in	   a	   drawn	   out	  dialogue	   between	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeals	   and	   State	   officials,	   characterized	   by	   court	  orders	  to	  provide	  additional	  funding	  to	  schools	  followed	  by	  State	  appeals.	  Marcou-­‐O’Malley	   (2014)	   contends	   that	   the	   common	   result	   of	   this	   process	   is	   the	   State	  undercutting	   the	   original	   proposal	   issued	   by	   the	   court.	   This	   has	   resulted	   in	   an	  estimated	   5.9	   billion	   dollars	   in	   Foundation	   Aid	   and	   Gap	   Elimination	   Adjustment	  funding	   being	   owed	   to	   public	   schools	   by	   the	   State	   as	   of	  August	   of	   2014	   (Marcou-­‐O’Malley,	  2014).	  	   The	  observed	  effects	  within	  the	  literature	  of	  these	  reforms	  on	  school	  funding	  and	  academic	  achievement	  have	  mostly	  been	  characterized	  by	  increases	  in	  spending	  on	  poor	   districts	   and	   mixed	   results	   concerning	   student	   performance.	   As	   previously	  mentioned,	   California’s	   distancing	   from	   property	   tax	   revenue	   as	   a	   public	   school	  funding	   source	   has	   been	   associated	   with	   less	   local	   funding	   and	   poor	   academic	  performance	   (Kenyon,	   2007).	   Murray,	   Evans,	   and	   Schwab	   (1998)	   provided	   a	  foundation	   for	   these	   studies	   by	   investigating	   the	   relationship	   of	   court	   judgments	  and	  district	  spending,	  noting	  that	  school	  district	  spending	  inequalities	  had	  reduced	  by	  19	  percent	  between	  1972	  and	  1992,	   a	   time	  period	  when	   the	   volume	  of	   school	  finance	   litigation	   suits	   was	   high	   (Berry,	   2007).	   Studies	   including	   Murray	   et	   al.	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(1998)	   have	   asserted	   that	   the	   main	   results	   of	   these	   reforms	   are	   increases	   in	  spending	   for	  poorer	  schools.	  Baicker	  &	  Gordon	  (2006)	  assert	   that	   finance	  reforms	  have	   increased	   state	   spending	   on	  poorer	   schools	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   aid	   previously	  devoted	  to	  public	  programs	  in	  wealthier	  areas.	  Card	  &	  Payne	  (2002)	  relate	  similar	  findings,	  noting	  that	  significant	  differences	  in	  spending	  are	  only	  observed	  in	  states	  where	   school	   finance	   systems	   were	   deemed	   unconstitutional;	   they	   also	   find	   that	  following	  attempts	  to	  equalize	  spending,	  the	  distribution	  of	  SAT	  test	  scores	  narrows	  across	   family	   background	   groups.	   Jackson,	   Johnson,	   and	   Persico	   (2014)	   make	   an	  empirical	   claim	   that	   these	   increases	   in	   spending	   have	   a	   positive	   effect	   on	   adult	  outcomes	  such	  as	  years	  of	  schooling	  and	  earnings.	  	  	   The	   structural	   effects	   of	   school	   finance	   litigation	   are	   characterized	   by	   the	  manifestations	  of	  school	  funding	  systems	  with	  varying	  dependencies	  on	  local,	  state,	  and	   federal	   sources.	  Our	  empirical	   investigation	  concerns	  schools	  districts	  of	  New	  York	  State,	  which	  rely	  heavily	  on	  local	  property	  taxes	  as	  a	  source	  for	  funding.	  State	  and	   federal	   aid	   is	   dispersed	   to	   all	   districts	   in	   New	   York,	   although	  most	   non-­‐local	  assistance	   is	   given	   to	   districts	   that	   have	   insufficient	   property	   tax	   revenues.	  While	  these	  equalization	  attempts	  have	  curbed	   funding	  gaps	  to	  an	  extent,	  per-­‐pupil	   total	  revenues	   of	   New	   York	   school	   districts	   are	   still	   not	   entirely	   uniform.	   This	   is	  exemplified	   by	   the	   distribution	   of	   per-­‐pupil	   total	   revenues	   that	   is	   depicted	   in	   the	  histogram	  in	  Figure	  8	  (Appendix	  II).	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3.	  Model	  Specification 
	   As	   previously	   mentioned,	   a	   quantitative	   approach	   to	   solving	   the	   problem	   of	  performance	  gaps	   identifies	  academic	  achievement	  as	  a	   function	  of	   incentives	  and	  inputs	  to	  the	  education	  production	  function.	  Inputs	  in	  our	  model	  will	  take	  the	  form	  of	   variables	   concerning	   demographics	   and	   school	   district	   finance,	   which	   is	   of	  particular	   interest.	   There	   is	   no	   deliberate	   attempt	   to	  measure	   student	   incentives,	  however	   it	   is	   expected	   that	   some	   of	   the	   demographic	   variables	   could	   indirectly	  affect	  them.	  The	  inability	  to	  quantify	  incentives	  coupled	  with	  the	  availability	  of	  data	  at	   the	   school	   district	   level	   is	   the	   reason	   for	   this	   omission,	   though	   considering	   the	  ineffectual	  nature	  of	  No	  Child	  Left	  Behind,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  results	  of	  Fryer	  (2010),	  the	  direct	  effects	  of	  student	  incentives	  on	  academic	  outcomes	  could	  be	  minimal.	  Data	  to	  be	  utilized	  within	  this	  model	  have	  been	  organized	  in	  a	  panel	  format	  as	  observations	  are	  taken	  by	  district	  and	  year.	  	  	   The	   reliability	   of	   test	   scores	   as	   an	   indicator	   of	   student	   performance	   is	  questionable,	   especially	   that	   of	   standardized	   tests.	   Standardized	   tests	   are	  notoriously	  narrow	  (Dee	  &	  Jacob,	  2010).	  They	  often	  test	  a	  small	  number	  of	  subjects,	  of	  which	  only	  certain	  subsets	  are	  focused	  on.	  This	  leads	  to	  instances	  of	  teaching	  and	  learning	   to	   the	   test,	   which	   makes	   test	   scores	   an	   inadequate	   indicator	   of	   student	  performance	   as	   a	   whole.	   Additional	   factors	   such	   as	   test-­‐taking	   abilities	   and	  administrative	   cheating	   contribute	   further	   to	   results	   that	   can	   overestimate	   or	  underestimate	  student	  performance	  in	  a	  given	  school	  or	  district.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  this	   model	   will	   comprise	   of	   two	   parts,	   one	   considering	   eighth	   grade	   English	  Language	  Arts	   and	  Mathematics	   test	   scores	   and	   the	   other	   considering	   graduation	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rates.	   Graduation	   rates	   can	   be	   skewed	   as	   well;	   certain	   district	   requirements	   for	  graduation	  may	   be	   stricter	   or	  more	   lenient	   than	   others.	   However	   by	   interpreting	  separate	  results	  with	  both	  graduation	  rates	  and	  standardized	  test	  scores,	  this	  model	  aims	  to	  find	  a	  middle	  ground	  that	  minimizes	  distortion	  by	  both	  variables.	  	  	   A	  simple	  regression	  in	  our	  model	  concerns	  student	  performance	  on	  the	  per-­‐pupil	  revenue	   generated	   from	   property	   taxes	   of	   a	   given	   district.	   It	   is	   commonplace	   to	  assume	   that	   academic	   achievement	   is	   largely	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   amount	   of	  resources	  available	  (Hanushek,	  1997).	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  consideration	  of	  household	  income	   levels,	   poverty	   levels,	   unemployment,	   and	   other	   variables	   of	   the	   like	   that	  may	   have	   an	   effect	   on	   performance.	   Our	  model	   focuses	   on	   the	   effect	   of	   per-­‐pupil	  property	  tax	   funding,	  which	  highlights	   inequalities	   in	   local	   funding	  across	  districts	  that	   coincide	   with	   performance	   gaps.	   	   Moreover,	   findings	   on	   this	   front	   would	  suggest	  an	  agent	  of	  local	  autonomy,	  in	  that	  advanced	  academic	  achievement	  is	  more	  tangible	   for	   the	   members	   of	   districts	   with	   inflated	   property	   values	   via	   their	   tax	  contributions	  than	  those	  with	  lesser	  property	  values.	  Hoxby	  (1997)	  argued	  that	  this	  was	  due	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  higher	  accountability,	  in	  that	  districts	  that	  pay	  more	  out	  of	   pocket	   hold	   their	   schools	   to	   a	   higher	   standard,	   effectively	   pushing	   schools	   to	  better	   educate	   their	   students.	   This	   goes	   hand	   in	   hand	  with	   findings	   from	  Glaeser	  (1996)	   and	   Fiva	   &	   Rønning	   (2008),	   who	   discuss	   the	   effects	   of	   property	   taxes	   on	  incentives	  in	  local	  governments.	  	  	   When	   including	   other	   variables,	   the	   eliminated	   bias	   of	   omitting	   them	   and	   the	  changes	  to	  the	  coefficient	  of	  per-­‐pupil	  property	  tax	  revenue	  need	  to	  be	  elucidated.	  We	  can	  refer	  to	  the	  equation	  below,	  where	  b1	  is	  the	  original	  biased	  coefficient	  of	  per-­‐
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pupil	  property	  tax	  revenue,	  β1	  is	  the	  corrected	  coefficient,	  β2	  is	  the	  coefficient	  of	  the	  control	  variable,	  and	  δ	  is	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  control	  variable	  has	  on	  our	  variable	  of	  interest.	  Hence	  the	  composite	  term	  δ	  β2	  	  signifies	  the	  bias.	  	  	  
𝑏! = 𝛽! + 𝛿𝛽!	  
	   Besides	   the	   effects	   of	   resource	   availability,	   the	   only	   clear	   indicator	   of	   student	  performance,	   aside	   from	   student	   incentives,	   is	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   an	  administration	  uses	   their	   revenue,	   i.e.	   expenditure.	  While	   revenues	  may	   in	   theory	  affect	   expenditure,	   expenditure	   decisions	   and	   divisions	   do	   not	   affect	   the	   revenue	  channel	  to	  student	  performance.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  data	  may	  reveal	  this	  correlation;	  hence	  we	  expect	  the	  value	  of	  δ	  to	  be	  positive.	  The	  variables	  that	  we	  will	  be	  using	  are	  the	   per-­‐pupil	   amounts	   of	   expenditure	   that	   are	   used	   on	   instruction	   and	   capital	  outlay,	  the	  latter	  of	  which	  includes	  expenditure	  on	  instructional	  equipment,	  such	  as	  textbooks	  or	  other	  supplemental	  material	   that	   is	  utilized	   to	  better	  equip	  students.	  The	  value	  of	  the	  coefficients	  of	  these	  expenditure	  variables	  are	  also	  expected	  to	  be	  positive,	  assuming	  that	  a	  greater	  devotion	  to	  expenditure	  on	  instruction	  should	  have	  a	  positive	  effect	  of	  student	  performance.	  Therefore,	  we	  surmise	  the	  bias	  of	  omitting	  these	  expenditure	  variables	  to	  be	  positive,	  meaning	  that	  the	  coefficient	  of	  per-­‐pupil	  property	  tax	  revenue	  will	  decrease	  upon	  their	  inclusion.	  	   	  Household	  income	  may	  have	  a	  direct	  effect	  on	  performance	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  property	   taxes,	   in	   that	   richer	   neighborhoods	   do	   not	   always	   have	   high	   property	  values,	  and	  higher	   incomes	  may	  increase	  educational	  resources	  outside	  of	  schools,	  such	   as	   in	   the	   household.	   Nevertheless,	   we	   presume	   that	   the	   main	   affect	   goes	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through	   the	   property	   tax	   revenue	   channel.	   Quantitatively,	   this	   signifies	   a	   positive	  bias,	  meaning	  that	  since	  household	  income	  will	  have	  a	  positive	  coefficient,	  including	  it	   will	   decrease	   the	   value	   of	   the	   per-­‐pupil	   property	   tax	   revenue	   coefficient.	   This	  variable	  will	  be	  measured	  as	  the	  median	  household	  income	  of	  a	  given	  district.	  	  	   Poverty	  levels,	  Hispanic	  and	  Black	  percentages,	  and	  unemployment	  rates	  are	  all	  anticipated	   to	   have	   negative	   effects	   on	   performance,	   in	   that	   they	   are	   the	   primary	  indicators	  of	  poorer	  neighborhoods.	  The	  poverty	  of	  a	  neighborhood	  may	  have	  to	  do	  with	   the	   incentive	   channel	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   availability	   of	   resources	   to	   students	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  schools.	  Additionally,	  high	  poverty	  levels	  can	  coincide	  with	  high	   income-­‐inequality,	   which	   overlaps	   with	   performance	   gaps.	   Traditionally	   the	  literature	  has	  supposed	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  measures	  on	  academic	  achievement	  are	  negative	  (White,	  1982;	  Sirin,	  2005).	  The	  bias	  of	  these	  variables	  being	  omitted	  is	  associated	   with	   property	   values	   via	   the	   historical	   implications	   of	   districts	   being	  largely	   black,	   Hispanic,	   or	   poor,	   in	   that	   districts	   with	   historical	   diversity	   on	   this	  front	  may	  have	  generated	  white-­‐flight,	  driving	  property	  values	  down	  to	  what	   they	  are	  today.	  Hence,	  through	  this	  medium	  some	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  racial	  percentages	  and	  poverty	  levels	  is	  funneled	  through	  the	  property	  tax	  channel.	  Furthermore,	  the	  bias	  of	  these	  terms	  is	  positive,	  so	  by	  including	  them	  we	  expect	  the	  per-­‐pupil	  property	  tax	  revenue	  coefficient	  to	  decrease,	  because	  their	  respective	  coefficients	  should	  also	  be	  negative.	  	   The	   assumption	   for	   educational	   attainment	   of	   a	   district	   is	   a	   positive	   effect	   as	  districts	   with	   higher	   percentages	   of	   high	   school	   and	   college	   graduates	   will	  experience	  better	  academic	  achievement.	  This	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  influence	  that	  
	   24	  
parents	   with	   more	   education	   may	   have	   on	   their	   children,	   which	   has	   been	  investigated	   previously	   in	   the	   literature	   (Davis-­‐Kean,	   2005;	   Magnuson,	   2007;	  Dubow	   &	   Huesmann,	   2009).	   There	   is	   no	   theoretical	   backing	   for	   educational	  attainment	   to	   affect	   the	   revenue	   of	   a	   district,	   so	   it	   can	   be	   added	   with	   little	  discrepancy	  and	  no	  assumptions	  of	  bias.	  	  	   Lastly,	  variables	  concerning	  enrollment	  and	  non-­‐local	  revenue	  are	  included.	  The	  effect	   of	   enrollment	   on	   performance	   has	   been	   contested	   within	   the	   literature,	  stemming	   from	   a	   concerted	   effort	   by	   administrators	   in	   the	   1930’s	   to	   consolidate	  schools,	   believing	   that	   as	   district	   size	   increased	   economies	   of	   scale	   and	  specialization	  would	   improve	   efficiency	   and	   performance	   (Robertson,	   2007).	   This	  policy	  has	  been	  criticized	  after	  its	  implementation,	  with	  many	  claiming	  that	  smaller	  district	  size	  is	  more	  conducive	  for	  a	  learning	  environment	  (Fowler	  &	  Walberg,	  1991;	  Driscoll,	  Halcoussis,	  &	  Svorny,	  2003),	  and	  others	  alluding	  to	  an	  optimal	  district	  size,	  which	   implies	   the	  existence	  of	  economies	  and	  diseconomies	  of	   scale	   in	   relation	   to	  performance.	   To	   appropriately	   fit	   the	   effect	   of	   enrollment	   on	   achievement	   we	  include	   the	   square	   of	   enrollment	   in	   our	   estimation,	   expecting	   a	   concave	  characterization	   of	   enrollment’s	   relationship	   with	   achievement.	   Hence	   we	   expect	  the	  coefficient	  of	  enrollment	  squared	  to	  be	  negative,	  and	  have	  no	  clear	  expectation	  for	  the	  sign	  of	  the	  coefficient	  of	  enrollment.	  	  	   This	  paper’s	  hypothesis	   emphasizes	   the	  effect	  of	   local	   revenue,	   specifically	   that	  generated	  from	  property	  taxes.	  	  Therefore	  it	  follows	  that	  we	  anticipate	  the	  effect	  of	  per-­‐pupil	   non-­‐local	   revenue,	   which	   is	   composed	   of	   state	   and	   federal	   revenue,	   to	  have	   a	   less	   pronounced	   effect	   on	   academic	   achievement	   than	   local	   revenue.	   The	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effect	  of	  non-­‐local	   revenue	  on	   local	   revenue	   is	   theoretically	  nonexistent,	  but	   since	  we	   presume	   there	   to	   be	   a	   negative	   correlation	   between	   non-­‐local	   revenues	   and	  property	   tax	   revenues,	   the	   sign	   of	   δ	   in	   this	   instance	   will	   be	   negative.	   There	   is	   a	  possibility	   for	   the	   coefficients	   of	   federal	   and	   state	   revenue	   to	   be	   endogenous	  because	   the	   amount	   of	   state	   and	   federal	   revenue	   allocated	   to	   districts	   can	   be	  responsive	   to	   student	   performance,	   either	   directly	   or	   indirectly.	   Federal	   revenue,	  which	   amounted	   to	   approximately	   five	   percent	   of	   total	   revenue	   generated	   by	  schools	   in	  New	  York	  State	   for	   the	  2011-­‐2012	  school	  year,	   is	  mostly	  allocated	  on	  a	  basis	  of	  need.	  Title	  1	  aid	  accounts	  for	  roughly	  34	  percent	  of	  all	  federal	  revenue,	  and	  is	  given	  out	  to	  poorer	  districts.	  A	  school	  improvement	  grant	  gives	  funds	  to	  schools	  that	   are	   deemed	   “low-­‐performing”,	   although	   this	   grant	   only	   accounted	   for	   $38	  million	  dollars	  during	  the	  2011-­‐2012	  school	  year	  which	  was	  a	  meager	  1.2	  percent	  of	  all	   federal	   aid	   for	   that	   year.	   State	   aid	   accounted	   for	   roughly	   40	   percent	   of	   total	  revenue	  generated	  for	  school	  districts	  in	  New	  York	  State	  for	  2011-­‐2012;	  its	  primary	  objective	  is	  to	  equalize	  the	  funding	  gaps	  that	  are	  apparent	  due	  to	  the	  use	  of	  property	  taxes	  as	  a	  source	  of	  revenue.	  Like	  federal	  aid,	  a	  very	  small	  percentage	  of	  total	  state	  aid	   is	  given	   to	  schools	   that	  are	  considered	   low	  achievers.	  Hence	  we	  do	  not	  expect	  direct	  endogeneity	  to	  be	  overtly	  present;	  upon	  controlling	  for	  poverty	  levels,	  as	  well	  as	  utilizing	  fixed	  effects,	  this	  paper	  attempts	  to	  cut	  down	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  reverse	  causality	   as	   much	   as	   possible.	   Nevertheless,	   we	   may	   still	   experience	   a	   negative	  coefficient	   for	   per-­‐pupil	   federal	   and	   state	   revenues,	   signifying	   a	   positive	   bias	   and	  therefore	  decreasing	   the	  value	  of	   the	  coefficient	  of	  per-­‐pupil	  property	   tax	  revenue	  upon	  their	  inclusion.	  The	  negative	  coefficients	  of	  non-­‐local	  revenues	  would	  suggest	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that	  when	  per-­‐pupil	   property	   tax	   revenue	   is	   held	   constant,	   the	  districts	   that	   have	  higher	   per-­‐pupil	   state	   and	   federal	   revenues	   have	   lower	   achievement	   levels	   in	  comparison	  to	  the	  districts	  with	  lower	  non-­‐local	  revenues.	  This	  would	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  research	  questions	  of	  this	  paper,	  as	  the	  districts	  with	  high	  per-­‐pupil	  state	  and	  federal	  revenues	  are,	  usually,	  the	  ones	  that	  also	  have	  lower	  per-­‐pupil	  property	  tax	   revenue	   and	   vice	   versa.	   Hence,	   we	   can	   expect	   these	   coefficients	   to	   tell	   a	  relationship	  story	  rather	  than	  one	  of	  causality.	  	  	   In	  utilizing	  most	  components	  of	  per-­‐pupil	  total	  revenue	  and	  some	  components	  of	  per-­‐pupil	   total	   expenditure	   there	   is	   a	   risk	   of	   multicollinearity	   between	   them,	  because	   in	   most	   districts	   total	   revenue	   is	   either	   equal	   to	   or	   very	   close	   to	   total	  expenditure.	   To	   resolve	   this	   we	  will	   consider	   variance-­‐inflation	   factors	   (VIF)	   and	  include	   the	   results	   of	   a	   random	   effects	   estimation	  with	   the	   expenditure	   variables	  excluded,	  shown	  in	  Table	  6	  (Appendix	  I).	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4.	  Data	  
	   Data	   for	   this	   paper	  were	   collected	   from	   both	   state	   and	   national	   sources,	   all	   of	  which	   concerns	   school	   districts	   in	  New	  York	   State.	  Graduation	   rates	   and	  ELA	  and	  Math	   test	   score	   data	   were	   gathered	   from	   the	   New	   York	   State	   department	   of	  education1,	   data	   on	   school	   district	   finance	   were	   collected	   from	   the	   United	   States	  Census	   Bureau2,	   and	   data	   regarding	   demographics,	   social	   characteristics,	   and	  economic	   characteristics	   were	   collected	   from	   the	   National	   Center	   For	   Education	  Statistics3.	   Graduation	   Rates	   and	   school	   district	   finance	   data	   spans	   from	   2005	   to	  2012	  whereas	  ELA	  and	  Math	  scores	  span	  from	  2006	  to	  2012	  since	  standardized	  test	  score	   data	   for	   2005	   were	   not	   available.	   Demographic,	   social,	   and	   economic	   data	  concerns	   the	   years	   of	   2005	   through	   2012,	   and	   were	   generated	   from	   American	  Community	  Survey	  (ACS)	  estimates	  based	  on	  the	  decennial	  census.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	   that	   this	   data	   was	   expanded	   from	   four	   years	   to	   eight	   years	   by	   duplicating	  estimates	   for	   the	  years	  2005-­‐2006,	  2007-­‐2008,	  2009-­‐2010,	  and	  2011-­‐2012,	  which	  came	  from	  ACS	  profiles	  of	  years	  2005-­‐2009,	  2006-­‐2010,	  2007-­‐2011,	  and	  2008-­‐2012	  respectively.	   This	   was	   done	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   improve	   upon	   the	   methodology	  concerning	  demographics	  observed	  in	  Mensah	  et	  al.	  (2013),	  where	  such	  data	  were	  time	   invariant	  observations	  obtained	   from	  the	  decennial	   census	  of	  2000.	  By	  using	  estimates	   that	   differ	   every	   two	   years,	  we	   aim	   to	   not	   only	   obtain	   a	  more	   accurate	  representation	  of	  demographic	  and	  socioeconomic	   factors,	  but	   to	  also	  prevent	  our	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://www.p12.nysed.gov/irs/cohort/archive-­‐grad.html	  	  2	  http://www.census.gov/did/www/schooldistricts/data/finance.html	  3	  http://nces.ed.gov/programs/edge/demographic.aspx	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fixed	  effects	  estimation	   from	  essentially	  omitting	  these	  variables.	   	  A	  description	  of	  all	   variables	   to	   be	  used	   is	   given	   in	  Table	   I	   (Appendix	   I).	   Figures	   1,	   2,	   and	  3	   show	  histograms	  depicting	   the	   distribution	   of	   our	   dependent	   variables	   (Appendix	   II).	   A	  histogram	  depicting	  the	  distribution	  of	  per-­‐pupil	  property	  tax	  revenues	  is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  4	  (Appendix	  II).	   Scatter	   plots	   of	   graduation	   rates,	   mean	   scaled	   ELA	   test	  scores,	   and	  mean	   scaled	  Math	   test	   scores	   corresponding	   to	   the	   natural	   log	   of	   our	  primary	   independent	   variable	   of	   interest,	   the	   per-­‐pupil	   amount	   property	   tax	  revenue	  per	  district,	  are	  shown	  in	  Figures	  5,	  6,	  and	  7	  respectively	  (Appendix	  II).	  	  	   Descriptive	   statistics	   for	   all	   variables	   in	   question	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   Table	   2	  (Appendix	  I).	  The	  means	  of	  our	  test	  variables,	  graduation	  rates	  (GRADRATE),	  mean	  scaled	   ELA	   test	   scores	   (MEAN_ELA),	   and	   mean	   scaled	   Math	   test	   scores	  (MEAN_MATH)	  are	  81.648%,	  661.081,	   and	  672.577	   respectively.	  Graduation	   rates	  ranged	  from	  28%	  to	  100%,	  the	  mean	  scaled	  score	  of	  ELA	  examinations	  ranged	  from	  622.110	  and	  705.750,	  and	  the	  mean	  scaled	  score	  of	  Math	  examinations	  ranged	  from	  614.093	  to	  710.	  The	  medians	  were	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  means,	  and	  Math	  scores	  were	  more	  varied	  than	  ELA	  scores,	  exhibited	  by	  a	  variance	  of	  226.493	  in	  comparison	  to	  a	  variance	  of	  110.525	  for	  ELA	  scores.	  The	  distributions	  of	  these	  variables	  (as	  shown	  in	  Figures	  1,	  2,	  and	  3)	  are	  fairly	  normal;	  the	  distributions	  of	  graduation	  rates	  and	  Math	  scores	  are	  slightly	  skewed	  left.	  	  	   The	  means	   of	   our	  main	   independent	   variables,	   per-­‐pupil	   property	   tax	   revenue	  (PROP_PP),	   per-­‐pupil	   state	   revenue	   (STATE_PP),	   and	   per-­‐pupil	   federal	   revenue	  (FED_PP)	   are	   $8,492,	   $8,928	   and	   $860	   respectively.	   The	   variances	   of	   per-­‐pupil	  property	   tax	   revenue	   (PROP_PP),	   per-­‐pupil	   state	   revenue	   (STATE_PP),	   and	   per-­‐
	   29	  
pupil	   federal	   revenue	   (FED_PP)	   are	  37.337,	   12,344,	   and	  0.281	   respectively,	  which	  exposes	  a	  more	  varied	  distribution	  of	  property	   tax	   revenue	   than	   that	  of	   state	  and	  federal	   revenues,	   and	   a	   more	   varied	   distribution	   of	   state	   revenues	   than	   that	   of	  federal	   revenues.	  A	  histogram	  depicting	   the	  distribution	  of	   per-­‐pupil	   property	   tax	  revenue	   (PROP_PP)	   is	   shown	   in	   Figure	   4	   (Appendix	   II),	   which	   relates	   a	   normal	  distribution	  that	  is	  skewed	  right.	  The	  mean	  enrollment	  is	  2,654,	  whereas	  the	  median	  is	  1,641.	  Enrollments	  range	  from	  55	  to	  38,686	  students,	  with	  a	  variance	  of	  10.187.	  	  	   Variance-­‐inflation	  factors	  (labeled	  VIF	  in	  Table	  2)	  are	  all	  under	  7,	  which	  indicate	  that	  multicollinearity	  is	  not	  a	  problem.	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5.	  	   Approaches	  and	  Results	  
	   As	   previously	   mentioned,	   all	   data	   to	   be	   tested	   has	   been	   organized	   in	   panel	  format.	   Let	   Yit	   =	   [Y1it,…,Ynit]	   represent	   n	   dependent	   variables	   of	   interest.	   Hence,	   a	  general	  panel	  specification	  is	  given	  by:	  	  
	   𝑌!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋1!" + 𝜖! + 𝜖! + 𝜖!"	  	  	  
where	  subscript	  i	  refers	  to	  a	  specific	  district	  and	  subscript	  t	  refers	  to	  a	  specific	  year.	  In	  our	  model,	  there	  is	  only	  one	  type	  of	  independent	  variable,	  X1,	  which	  varies	  over	  districts	  and	  time.	  Tables	  3,	  4,	  and	  5	  (Appendix	  I)	  shows	  results	  from	  three	  different	  estimations,	  corresponding	  to	  time	  fixed	  effects,	  time	  and	  district	  fixed	  effects,	  and	  random	   effects	   estimations	   respectively.	   Regressions	   within	   estimation	   type	   are	  labeled	  by	  their	  dependent	  variable	  of	  graduation	  rates	  (GRADRATE),	  mean	  scaled	  ELA	   test	   scores	   (MEAN_ELA),	   and	   mean	   scaled	   Math	   test	   scores	   (MEAN_MATH),	  respectively.	   We	   disregard	   the	   results	   of	   an	   ordinary-­‐least	   squares	   regression	  without	  any	  fixed	  effects	  due	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  correlation	  between	  the	  residuals	  and	  our	  independent	  variables.	  We	  discuss	  the	  outcomes	  of	  a	  Hausman	  test	  to	  determine	  whether	   to	   trust	   the	   fixed	   effects	   or	   random	   effects	   estimation,	   but	   reject	   its	  suggestion	  to	  interpret	  the	  district	  and	  time	  fixed	  effects	  estimation	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	   the	   districts	   within	   our	   sample	   do	   not	   possess	   significant	   variation	   through	  time	  which	   leads	   to	   noisy	   results	   in	   the	   time	   and	  district	   fixed	   effects	   estimation.	  This	  notion	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  overall	  R-­‐squares	  for	  all	  district	  and	  time	  fixed	   effects	   estimations	   are	   below	   0.07.	   Therefore,	   we	   use	   our	   random	   effects	  estimation	  as	  our	  means	  of	  empirically	   interpreting	   the	   relationship	  between	  per-­‐
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pupil	  property	  tax	  revenue	  and	  student	  performance.	  
5.	  1.	   Time	  Fixed	  Effects	  
	   Our	  first	  estimations	  are	  performed	  with	  ordinary-­‐least	  squares	  (OLS),	  where	  the	  data	  is	  pooled	  and	  dummy	  variables	  are	  added	  for	  each	  year.	  This	  approach	  is	  not	  as	  precise	  as	  also	  including	  district	  dummy	  variables,	  but	  it	  is	  more	  efficient.	  Results	  of	  this	  estimation	  can	  be	   found	   in	  Table	  3	   (Appendix	   I).	  All	  monetary	  variables	  have	  been	  measured	  with	  a	  natural	  log.	  These	  estimations	  have	  panel-­‐corrected	  standard	  errors	   and	   assume	   heteroskedasticity,	   as	   a	   plot	   of	   residuals	   against	   fitted	   values	  show	   a	   non-­‐constant	   variance	   and	   a	   formal	   test	   asserts	   the	   presence	   of	  heteroskedasticity.	  	  	   For	  all	  regressions	  year	  2012	  was	  omitted.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  since	  data	  for	   standardized	   test	   scores	   in	  New	  York	   for	   the	  year	  2005	  was	  not	  available,	   the	  dataset	  does	  not	  include	  observations	  for	  test	  scores	  in	  the	  year	  of	  2005,	  hence	  the	  absence	   of	   coefficients	   and	   standard	   errors.	   Graduation	   rates	   exhibited	   relatively	  consistent	   improvement	   through	   the	   years	  of	   2005	   to	  2009,	   and	   smoothed	  out	   to	  similar	  levels	  for	  2010,	  2011,	  and	  2012,	  as	  the	  coefficients	  of	  the	  dummy	  variables	  for	  2010	  and	  2011	  were	  insignificant.	  Mean	  scaled	  ELA	  scores	  were	  lower	  in	  2006	  and	  2011	  in	  comparison	  to	  2012,	  and	  higher	  in	  2008,	  2009,	  and	  2010.	  There	  was	  no	  significant	   difference	   to	   2012	   for	   ELA	   scores	   in	   2007.	   Math	   scores	   consistently	  improved	   for	   the	  years	  2006	   to	  2010,	  and	  were	  similar	   in	  2011	  and	  2012.	  This	   is	  consistent	   with	   findings	   that	   standardized	   Math	   scores	   improved	   within	   the	  confines	  of	  No	  Child	  Left	  Behind	  (Dee	  &	  Jacob,	  2010).	  	   For	  the	  moment	  we	  will	  forgo	  an	  interpretation	  of	  most	  of	  the	  control	  variables,	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seeing	  as	  we	  will	  prefer	  to	  analyze	  and	  trust	  the	  results	  of	  the	  random	  effects	  model.	  However	   it	   is	   interesting	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  coefficients	  of	  per-­‐pupil	  property	  tax	  revenue	   (PROP_PP),	   per-­‐pupil	   state	   revenue	   (STATE_PP),	   and	   per-­‐pupil	   federal	  revenue	   (FED_PP).	   Per-­‐pupil	   property	   tax	   revenue	   (PROP_PP),	   our	   main	  independent	   variable	   of	   interest,	   is	   highly	   significant	   when	   tested	   against	  graduation	   rates	   (GRADRATE)	   and	  mean	   scaled	  Math	   test	   scores	   (MEAN_MATH),	  and	   weakly	   significant	   when	   tested	   against	   mean	   scaled	   ELA	   test	   scores	  (MEAN_ELA).	   Per-­‐pupil	   property	   tax	   revenue	   (PROP_PP)	  has	   a	  positive	   coefficient	  associated	  with	  graduation	  rates	  (GRADRATE)	  and	  (MEAN_ELA),	  suggesting	   that	  a	  one	   percent	   increase	   in	   the	   mean	   of	   per-­‐pupil	   property	   tax	   revenue	   (PROP_PP)	  ($8,492)	   would	   invoke	   an	   increase	   of	   1.59	   percentage	   points	   in	   the	   average	  graduation	   rate	   (81.648%),	   and	   a	   0.758	   increase	   in	   the	   average	  mean	   scaled	  ELA	  score	   (661.081).	   Per-­‐pupil	   property	   tax	   revenue	   (PROP_PP)	   has	   a	   significantly	  negative	  coefficient	  when	  tested	  against	  Math	  scores,	  which	  is	  unexpected	  and	  lacks	  an	  explanation.	  This	  could	  speak	  to	  the	  idiosyncrasy	  of	  mathematical	  skill	  sets,	  or	  to	  pernicious	  techniques	  employed	  by	  educators	  in	  property	  tax	  poor	  districts	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  AYP	  status.	  	   The	   coefficient	   for	   per-­‐pupil	   federal	   revenue	   (FED_PP)	   is	   significantly	   negative	  for	   all	   regressions,	   which	   affirms	   our	   assumption	   that	   when	   holding	   per-­‐pupil	  property	   tax	   revenue	   constant,	   districts	   with	   higher	   federal	   revenues	   experience	  lower	  academic	  achievement.	  The	  coefficient	  of	  per-­‐pupil	  state	  revenue	  (STATE_PP)	  is	   also	   consistently	  negative	   across	   regressions,	   but	   is	   not	   significant	  when	   tested	  against	  graduation	  rates,	  suggesting	  no	  difference	  in	  graduation	  rates	  at	  the	  varied	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levels	  of	  per-­‐pupil	  state	  revenue	  when	  per-­‐pupil	  federal	  and	  property	  tax	  revenues	  are	  held	  constant.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  signs	  of	  the	  coefficients	  of	  non-­‐local	  revenues	  may	  be	  partly	  due	  to	  reverse	  causality.	  	   As	  we	  progress	  to	  the	  fixed	  effects	  and	  random	  effects	  methods	  we	  recall	  that	  the	  results	  of	  the	  ordinary-­‐least	  squares	  estimations	  with	  time	  fixed	  effects	  are	  merely	  suggestive;	  this	  paper	  makes	  no	  assumptions	  based	  on	  them,	  but	  rather	  uses	  them	  as	  a	  starting	  point.	  
5.	  2.	   District	  and	  Time	  Fixed	  Effects	  and	  Random	  Effects	  	   We	   then	   utilize	   the	   time	   and	   district	   fixed	   effects	   method,	   which	   generates	   a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  each	  district	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  dummy	  variables	  for	  each	  year,	  as	  well	  as	  random	  effects.	  Using	  time	  and	  district	  fixed	  effects	  changes	  our	  equation	  to	  as	  follows:	  
	   𝑌!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋1!" + 𝛼! + 𝛼! + 𝜖!"	  
where	  αi	  and	  αt	  are	  the	  unknown	  intercepts	  for	  each	  district	  and	  year	  respectively.	  Hence	  𝜖! 	  and	  𝜖!	  have	  been	  replaced,	  and	  𝜖!"	  is	  now	  a	  classical	  error	  term.	  
	   When	  utilizing	  random	  effects,	  we	  essentially	  operate	  a	  GLS	  estimation	  that	  corrects	  for	  errors	  that	  are	  correlated	  over	  time	  within	  districts	  such	  that	  the	  new	  error	  term	  is	  classical.	  	   Results	  of	   the	  time	  and	  district	   fixed	  effects	  and	  random	  effects	  estimations	  are	  shown	   in	   Tables	   4	   and	   5	   (Appendix	   I)	   respectively.	   As	   previously	  mentioned,	   the	  results	   of	   Hausman	   tests	   for	   deciding	   which	   method	   is	   more	   appropriate	   are	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considered;	   for	   all	   three	   regressions	   Hausman	   tests	   determine	   a	   significant	  systematic	  difference	  in	  coefficients,	  indicating	  that	  time	  and	  district	  fixed	  effects	  is	  a	  more	  appropriate	  estimator	  than	  random	  effects.	  However,	  we	  do	  not	  abide	  by	  its	  recommendation	  as	  the	  results	  of	  our	  time	  and	  district	  fixed	  effects	  estimations	  are	  somewhat	  noisy,	  and	  the	   fit	  of	   the	  models	  are	  poor.	  Time	  and	  district	   fixed	  effects	  regressions	   for	   test	   variables	   graduation	   rate	   (GRADRATE),	  mean	   scaled	   ELA	   test	  score	   (MEAN_ELA),	   and	   mean	   scaled	   Math	   test	   score	   (MEAN_MATH)	   have	  respective	  overall	  R-­‐squares	  of	  0.0007,	  0.0028,	  and	  0.0678.	  By	  choosing	  to	  hold	  to	  our	   random	   effect	   estimations	   we	   aim	   to	   utilize	   a	   more	   efficient	   and	   accurate	  estimator,	  but	  sacrifice	  precision.	  Time	  and	  district	  fixed	  effects	  correct	  for	  omitted	  variable	   biases	   that	   occur	   due	   to	   the	   presence	   of	   unobserved	   time	   invariant	  differences	  across	  districts;	  random	  effects	  estimates	  may	  not	  fully	  account	  for	  these	  differences,	   so	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   the	   coefficients	  will	   be	   biased	   and	   therefore	   less	  precise.	  	   Coupling	   results	   of	   the	   Hausman	   test	   with	   the	   R-­‐squares	   for	   each	   time	   and	  district	   fixed	   effects	  model,	   as	  well	   as	   acknowledging	   a	   lack	   of	   significant	   district	  variation	   through	   time	   within	   the	   demographic	   and	   socioeconomic	   controls,	   we	  deem	  random	  effects	  estimations	  more	  appropriate	  for	  our	  model.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  random	  effects	  estimations	  are	  shown	   in	  Table	  5	   (Appendix	   I).	  These	  results	  have	  robust	   standard	   errors	   and	   have	   been	   corrected	   for	   heteroskedasticity,	   as	   a	  likelihood	   ratio	   test	   significantly	   indicated	   the	   presence	   of	   residuals	   with	   a	   non-­‐constant	  variance.	   	  All	   independent	  variables	  that	  are	  measured	  in	  monetary	  units	  have	  been	  estimated	  with	  a	  natural	  log.	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5.	  3.	   Results	  	   Firstly,	  results	  of	  our	  main	  independent	  variables	  of	  interest	  are	  considered.	  The	  coefficients	  of	  the	  natural	  logs	  of	  per-­‐pupil	  state	  revenue	  (STATE_PP)	  and	  per-­‐pupil	  federal	  revenue	  (FED_PP)	  are	  significantly	  negative	  for	  all	  three	  regressions;	  this	  is	  consistent	   with	   our	   expectations	   and	   also	   suggests	   the	   possibility	   of	   reverse	  causality.	  Regardless,	  the	  sign	  of	  the	  coefficient	  implies	  that	  when	  holding	  per-­‐pupil	  property	   tax	   revenue	   constant,	   districts	   that	   have	   a	   higher	   reliance	   on	   state	   and	  federal	   funding	   have	   worse	   graduation	   rates	   and	   test	   scores	   than	   the	   ones	   that	  generate	   fewer	   per-­‐pupil	   state	   and	   federal	   dollars.	   	   	   The	   coefficient	   of	   per-­‐pupil	  property	   tax	   revenue	   (PROP_PP)	   is	   significantly	   positive	   when	   tested	   against	  graduation	  rates	  (GRADRATE)	  and	  mean	  scaled	  ELA	  test	  scores	  (MEAN_ELA),	  but	  is	  insignificant	  when	  tested	  against	  mean	  scaled	  Math	  test	  scores	  (MEAN_MATH).	  This	  relates	   our	   initial	   assumptions	   that	   when	   holding	   non-­‐local	   funding	   constant,	  districts	  that	  rely	  heavier	  on	  per-­‐pupil	  property	  tax	  revenue	  perform	  better	  on	  ELA	  standardized	   tests	   and	   have	   higher	   graduation	   rates.	   Our	   initial	   assumption	   does	  not	   hold	   true	   in	   regards	   to	   Math	   scores;	   as	   mentioned	   in	   the	   time	   fixed	   effects	  section,	   this	   could	   speak	   to	   the	   idiosyncrasy	   of	   mathematical	   skill	   sets,	   or	   to	  pernicious	  techniques	  employed	  by	  educators	  in	  property	  tax	  poor	  districts	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	   AYP	   status.	   These	   results	   are	   robust	   to	   our	   time	   fixed	   effects	  model,	  with	  the	  exception	  that	  the	  coefficient	  of	  per-­‐pupil	  property	  tax	  revenue	  (PROP_PP)	  was	   significantly	   negative	   when	   tested	   against	   mean	   scaled	   Math	   test	   scores	  (MEAN_MATH)	  in	  the	  time	  fixed	  effects	  model.	  	   When	   tested	   against	   graduation	   rates	   (GRADRATE)	   and	   mean	   scaled	   ELA	   test	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scores	   (MEAN_ELA),	   the	   coefficients	  of	   per-­‐pupil	   property	   tax	   revenue	   (PROP_PP)	  relate	   the	   predicted	   effect	   of	   a	   one	   percent	   increase	   in	   the	   mean	   of	   per-­‐pupil	  property	  tax	  revenue	  (from	  $8,492	  to	  $8,577)	  to	  increase	  the	  mean	  graduation	  rate	  by	  2.003	  percentage	  points	  (from	  81.648%	  to	  83.651%),	  and	  to	  increase	  the	  average	  mean	   scaled	   ELA	   score	   by	   2.390	   points	   (from	  661.081	   to	   663.471).	   The	   effect	   on	  graduation	   rates	   seems	   to	   be	   more	   pronounced,	   although	   comparing	   the	   two	   is	  somewhat	  shortsighted	  as	  they	  are	  measured	  on	  different	  scales.	  	  	   Year	   2012	   is	   suppressed	   for	   all	   three	   regressions.	   Graduation	   rates	   exhibit	  consistent	   improvement	   for	   the	   years	   2005	   to	   2010,	   and	   are	   not	   significantly	  different	  in	  the	  years	  2011	  and	  2012.	  	  ELA	  test	  scores	  seemed	  to	  suffer	  in	  2006	  and	  2011,	   but	   were	   higher	   than	   2012	   for	   the	   years	   2007	   to	   2010.	   Math	   scores	  consistently	   improved	   up	   to	   2011,	   and	  were	   similar	   in	   the	   years	   2011	   and	   2012.	  These	  results	  are	  robust	  to	  the	  time	  fixed	  effects	  estimation.	  	   The	  coefficient	  of	  per-­‐pupil	  expenditure	  on	  instruction	  (INST_PP)	  is	  significantly	  negative	  when	  tested	  against	  graduation	  rates	  (GRADRATE)	  and	  insignificant	  when	  tested	  against	  mean	  scaled	  ELA	  test	  scores	  (MEAN_ELA)	  and	  mean	  scaled	  Math	  test	  scores	   (MEAN_MATH).	   The	   significant	   negative	   coefficient	   is	   unexpected,	   and	  suggests	   that	   when	   holding	   revenues	   constant,	   districts	   that	   spend	   more	   on	  instruction	  have	   lower	  graduation	  rates.	  The	  coefficient	  of	  per-­‐pupil	  capital	  outlay	  expenditure	   (CAP_PP)	   is	   insignificant	   when	   tested	   against	   graduation	   rates	  (GRADRATE)	   but	   significantly	   positive	   when	   tested	   against	   test	   scores.	   This	   can	  support	  the	  theory	  of	  teaching	  to	  the	  test;	  more	  spending	  on	  specialized	  capital	  can	  improve	   test	   scores	  but	  not	  graduation	  rates.	  These	  results	  are	  robust	   to	   the	   time	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fixed	   effects	   model.	   Amidst	   concerns	   over	   multicollinearity	   between	   expenditure	  controls	  and	  our	  revenue	  variables,	  we	  have	  included	  the	  results	  of	  a	  random	  effects	  estimation	  without	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  expenditure	  variables	  in	  Table	  6	  (Appendix	  I).	   The	   changes	   in	   the	   coefficients	   of	   our	   revenue	   variables	   in	   this	   estimation	   are	  explained	   by	   the	   expected	   biases	   of	   omitting	   the	   expenditure	   variables,	   and	   the	  variance-­‐inflation	  factors	  (VIFs)	  of	  per-­‐pupil	  instruction	  expenditure	  (INST_PP)	  and	  per-­‐pupil	  capital	  outlay	  expenditure	  (CAP_PP)	  are	  4.060	  and	  1.090	  respectively.	  The	  inclusion	   of	   these	   expenditure	   variables	   does	   not	   affect	   the	   significance	   of	   our	  revenue	  variables.	  Hence,	  we	  can	  assert	  that	  multicollinearity	  is	  not	  an	  issue.	  	  	   Enrollment	  coefficients	  are	  consistent	  with	  our	  expectations	  when	  tested	  against	  test	  scores	  but	  not	  when	  tested	  against	  graduation	  rates	  (GRADRATE).	  When	  tested	  against	  mean	  scaled	  ELA	  test	  scores	  (MEAN_ELA)	  and	  mean	  scaled	  Math	  test	  scores	  (MEAN_MATH),	   the	   effect	   of	   enrollment	   on	   achievement	   is	   characterized	   by	   a	  concave	   relationship.	   The	   coefficients	   of	   enrollment	   are	   insignificant	   and	  significantly	  positive	  when	  tested	  against	  mean	  scaled	  ELA	  test	  scores	  	  (MEAN_ELA)	  and	  mean	  scaled	  Math	  test	  scores	  (MEAN_MATH)	  respectively,	  and	  the	  coefficients	  of	   enrollment-­‐squared	   are	   both	   significantly	   negative.	   This	   implies	   that	   schools	  receive	   positive	   returns	   of	   achievement	   (test	   scores)	   as	   they	   increase	   enrollment,	  reach	   an	   optimal	   level	   of	   enrollment,	   and	   then	   experience	   decreasing	   returns	   of	  achievement	  as	  they	  increase	  enrollment	  past	  that	  optimal	  point.	  The	  relationship	  is	  opposite	   in	   regards	   to	   graduation	   rates	   however;	   as	   districts	   increase	   enrollment	  they	   first	   approach	   a	   minimum	   achievement	   level	   (graduation	   rate),	   and	   then	  experience	   increasing	   returns	   to	   achievement	   past	   that	   minimum	   level.	   These	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results	   are	   robust	   to	   the	   time	   fixed	   effects	   model	   with	   the	   exception	   that	   the	  coefficient	   of	   enrollment-­‐squared	   is	   insignificant	   when	   only	   utilizing	   time	   fixed	  effects.	  
	   The	   coefficients	   of	   the	   percentages	   of	   the	   district	   population	   that	   is	   black	  (BLACK_R),	  Hispanic	   (HISP_R),	   and	   that	  have	  graduated	  high	   school	   (EDUC_R)	  are	  consistent	  with	  our	   expectations;	   the	   former	   two	   are	   significantly	  negative	   across	  regressions	  and	  the	  latter	  maintains	  a	  significantly	  positive	  coefficient	  for	  all	  three	  regressions.	   The	   coefficient	   of	   the	   percentage	   of	   families	   that	   are	   beneath	   the	  poverty	  line	  (POV_R)	  is	  consistent	  to	  our	  expectation	  of	  a	  negative	  sign	  when	  tested	  against	  graduation	  rates	  (GRADRATE),	  but	  is	  insignificant	  when	  tested	  against	  mean	  scaled	   ELA	   test	   scores	   (MEAN_ELA)	   and	   mean	   scaled	   Math	   test	   scores	  (MEAN_MATH).	  The	  unemployment	  rate	  of	  a	  district	  (UNEMP_R)	  is	  insignificant	  for	  all	   three	  regressions.	  The	  natural	   log	  of	   the	  median	  household	   income	  of	  a	  district	  (HOUSE_Y)	  has	  a	  significantly	  positive	  coefficient	  for	  all	  three	  regressions,	  which	  is	  consistent	  with	  our	   expectation.	  These	   results	   suggest	   that	   academic	   achievement	  can	   be	   a	   function	   of	   socioeconomic	   status,	   highlighting	   achievement	   gaps	  corresponding	  to	  income	  levels	  as	  well	  as	  demographic	  makeups	  of	  districts.	  These	  results	   are	   robust	   to	   the	   time	   fixed	   effects	   model	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   the	  unemployment	   rate	  of	   a	  district	   (UNEMP_R)	  when	   tested	  against	  graduation	   rates	  (GRADRATE),	  which	  has	  a	  significantly	  negative	  coefficient	  in	  the	  time	  fixed	  effects	  model.	  	   As	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  values	  of	  the	  coefficients	  within	  our	  random	  effects	  estimations	  are	  subject	  to	  scrutiny	  due	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  omitted	  variable	  biases	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generated	  from	  unobserved	  time	  invariant	  fixed	  effects	  across	  districts	  that	  are	  not	  controlled	   for	   by	   the	   random	   effects	   estimator.	   Nevertheless,	   although	   the	   exact	  value	   of	   the	   coefficient	   may	   not	   be	   extremely	   precise,	   we	   can	   confidently	   assert	  significant	  effects	  that	  are	  consistent	  with	  our	  initial	  expectations.	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6.	  Conclusions	  and	  Policy	  Recommendation	  
	   The	   research	   endeavors	   of	   this	   paper	   concerned	   the	   dependence	   on	   local	  property	   tax	   funding	  of	   public	   school	   districts,	   and	   its	   relationship	  with	   academic	  achievement	   as	  measured	   by	   graduation	   rates	   and	   standardized	   test	   scores.	   This	  was	  examined	  theoretically	  and	  then	  empirically	  through	  panel	  based	  econometric	  methods.	  	   A	   positive	   relationship	   between	   districts	   that	   assign	   a	   higher	   reliance	   on	   local	  property	   tax	   funding	   and	   academic	   achievement	   is	   evidenced	   by	   our	   empirical	  results	  within	  a	  time	  fixed	  effects	  model	  and	  a	  random	  effects	  model.	  School	  district	  per-­‐pupil	   property	   tax	   revenues	   were	   found	   to	   have	   a	   significant	   positive	  association	   with	   graduation	   rates	   and	   eighth	   grade	   English	   Language	   Arts	  standardized	   test	  scores,	  but	  not	  with	  eighth	  grade	  Math	  standardized	   test	  scores.	  These	  findings	  illustrate	  a	  linkage	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  findings	  of	  Mensah	  et	  al.	   (2013)	   and	   Fiva	   &	   Rønning	   (2008),	   studies	   that	   conducted	   similar	   empirical	  investigations	  of	  school	  districts	  in	  New	  Jersey	  and	  Norway	  respectively.	  	   These	  empirical	   conclusions	  sustain	  our	   theoretical	  argument	  and	  our	   research	  hypotheses	  by	  affirming	   that	  districts	   that	  pay	  higher	  property	   taxes	  enjoy	  higher	  academic	  achievement.	  We	  can	  distinguish	  our	  findings	  from	  those	  of	  Mensah	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  through	  the	  means	  of	  which	  property	  tax	  revenue	  was	  measured,	  which	  was	  via	   per-­‐pupil	   revenues	   instead	   of	   property	   tax	   shares	   of	   total	   revenues,	   and	   by	  expanding	   our	   model	   to	   include	   non-­‐local	   revenues,	   that	   is	   per-­‐pupil	   state	   and	  federal	   revenues	   that	   are	   primarily	   used	   to	   equalize	   funding	   gaps	   that	   naturally	  arise	   from	   disparities	   in	   property	   values.	   The	   empirical	   results	   regarding	   these	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measures	  also	  supported	  our	  hypotheses;	  holding	  per-­‐pupil	  property	  tax	  revenues	  constant,	   districts	   with	   higher	   per-­‐pupil	   state	   and	   federal	   revenues	   experienced	  worse	  graduation	   rates	   and	   test	   scores	   than	   those	  with	   fewer	  non-­‐local	   revenues,	  which	  is	  analogous	  to	  our	  findings	  concerning	  per-­‐pupil	  property	  tax	  revenues.	  	  	   The	  implications	  of	  these	  findings	  are	  manifold.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  they	  affirm	  the	  obvious:	   per-­‐pupil	   funding	   disparities	   that	   have	   not	   been	   corrected	   through	  equalization	   attempts	   of	   non-­‐local	   aid	   cause	   those	   underfunded	   schools	   to	   suffer	  academically.	   However	   they	   also	   imply	   a	   more	   intricate	   and	   problematic	  repercussion	  that	  arises	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  finance	  system	  in	  place,	  in	  that	  while	  simply	  contributing	  greater	  amounts	  of	  state	  and	  federal	  aid	  to	  property	  tax	  poor	  districts	  may	  in	  some	  cases	  do	  well	  to	  bridge	  the	  funding	  gap,	  it	  doesn’t	   provoke	   the	   intended	   effect	   on	   incentives	   and	   consequently	   achievement.	  The	   effects	   of	   taxpayer	   accountability	   on	   administrations	   are	   more	   significant;	  federal	   and	   state	   revenues	   fail	   to	   facilitate	   the	   community	   engagement	   that	   is	  necessary	   for	  administrative	  efficiency	   in	  stimulating	  student	  performance.	  Hence,	  by	  utilizing	  a	  system	  where	  we	  depend	  on	  property	  tax	  funding	  we	  are	  stifling	  the	  academic	   achievement	   of	   districts	   that	   cannot	   afford	   to	   or	   do	   not	   rely	   on	   it.	   The	  disparities	   disenfranchise	  members	   of	   property	   tax	  poor	   communities,	   dissuading	  them	  from	  engaging	  in	  administrative	  decisions	  that	  change	  the	  scope	  of	  educations	  that	  are	  provided	  in	  the	  schools	  in	  question.	  	  	   Mensah	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  and	  Kenyon	  (2007)	  contend	  that	  addressing	  the	  fairness	  of	  the	   system	   is	   important	   to	   fixing	   it	   by	   recommending	   that	   state	   and	   federal	  revenues	  should	  aim	  to	  relieve	  the	  burden	  of	  taxpayers	  who	  pay	  high	  property	  taxes	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in	  proportion	  to	  their	  household	  income.	  Although	  this	  lack	  of	  parity	  in	  property	  tax	  revenues	   in	   relation	   to	   household	   income	   is	   certainly	   apparent	   and	   affects	   the	  equality	  of	  the	  system,	  our	  results	  indicate	  that	  adjusting	  the	  system	  in	  this	  way	  may	  sacrifice	   efficiency	   and	   academic	   achievement	   in	   the	   process	   of	   making	   it	   more	  equitable.	  	  	   As	   long	  as	  public	  education	  systems	  continue	  to	  use	  property	  tax	  revenues	  as	  a	  means	  to	  fund	  the	  districts	  that	  they	  are	  drawn	  from,	  achievement	  gaps	  will	  prevail	  unless	   active	  parental	   and	   taxpayer	  engagement	   in	   administrative	  procedures	   can	  be	   stimulated	   exogenously.	   In	   order	   to	   promote	   both	   taxpayer	   equality	   and	  academic	   efficiency	   within	   the	   confines	   of	   public	   education	   funding,	   the	   current	  system	  needs	   to	   be	   phased	   out	   in	   favor	   of	   one	   that	   draws	   from	   a	  more	   equitable	  pool	  of	  tax	  revenue.	  	  	  By	  incorporating	  a	  proportional	  tax	  system	  in	  which	  members	  of	  different	  income	  brackets	  provide	  the	  same	  percentage	  of	  their	   income	  towards	  an	   aggregated	   fund	   devoted	   to	   financing	   public	   schools,	   we	   can	   experience	   a	   fair	  system	   that	   also	   promotes	   taxpayer	   accountability.	   The	   transition	   to	   this	   system	  would	  have	   to	  be	  gradual,	   aiming	   to	  preserve	   the	   incentive	  effects	  of	   taxpayers	   in	  property	  tax	  rich	  districts	  while	  stimulating	  those	  in	  property	  tax	  poor	  districts.	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Table&1Description+of+variablesVariable Definition+
Dependent'VariablesGRADRATE Graduation+rate+MEAN_ELA Mean+scaled+score+of+the+ELA+standardized+test+administered+by+New+York+State+MEAN_MATH Mean+scaled+score+of+the+Math+standardized+test+administered+by+New+York+State+
Socio2Economic'FactorsHOUSE_Y Median+Household+Income+of+school+districtPOV_R Percentage+of+families+that+are+beneath+the+poverty+line+in+school+districtBLACK_R Percentage+of+the+population+that+is+black+in+school+districtHISP_R Percentage+of+the+population+that+is+Hispanic+in+school+districtUNEMP_R Unemployment+rate+of+school+districtEDUC_R Percentage+of+population+with+at+least+a+high+school+degree+in+school+district
School'District'FactorsINST_PP PerNPupil+expenditure+on+instructionCAP_PP PerNPupil+expenditure+on+capital+outlaysENROLL Total+student+enrollment
School'District'RevenuesPROP_PP PerNPupil+revenue+generated+from+property+taxesSTATE_PP PerNPupil+revenue+generated+from+State+aidFED_PP PerNPupil+Revenue+generated+from+Federal+aid
8.	  Appendix	  I	  
Table&2Descriptive*Statistics*of*variablesVariable Scale Count Mean Median Standard*Deviation Variance Min Max VIFGRADRATE Percent 5091 81.648 83.000 10.329 106.683 28.000 100.000MEAN_ELA Percent 4459 661.081 661.000 10.513 110.525 622.110 703.750MEAN_MATH Percent 4459 672.577 674.000 15.050 226.493 614.093 710.000HOUSE_Y In*$000 5114 63.294 54.072 26.879 722.455 29.813 238.000 5.300POV_R Percent 5114 7.106 6.300 4.666 21.773 0.000 27.900 3.300BLACK_R Percent 5112 4.819 2.100 8.106 65.705 0.000 76.438 2.040HISP_R Percent 5112 5.411 2.748 7.294 53.209 0.000 62.662 2.740UNEMP_R Percent 5114 6.929 6.613 2.542 6.460 0.000 21.783 1.540EDUC_R Percent 5114 88.717 89.100 5.052 25.520 64.800 99.700 3.300INST_PP In*$000 5114 11.092 10.489 2.927 8.565 5.662 41.548 4.060CAP_PP In*$000 5114 1.629 0.705 2.723 7.415 0.015 63.435 1.090ENROLL In*000 5114 2.654 1.641 3.192 10.187 0.055 38.704 5.650PROP_PP In*$000 5114 8.482 6.434 6.110 37.337 0.413 57.572 6.330STATE_PP In*$000 5114 8.928 8.818 3.513 12.344 1.047 30.686 3.710FED_PP In*$000 5114 0.860 0.765 0.530 0.281 0.051 6.935 3.640
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Table&3Time%Fixed%EffectsGRADRATE MEAN_ELA MEAN_MATHCoefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SEln[PROP_PP] 1.590*** 0.413 0.758+ 0.433 K1.016*%% 0.484ln[STATE_PP] K0.472 0.399 K4.341*** 0.473 K4.412*** 0.539ln[FED_PP] K2.927*** 0.36 K4.203*** 0.416 K4.775*** 0.488ENROLL^2 0.0211*** 0.00214 K0.00134 0.00253 K0.0152*** 0.00302ENROLL K0.897*** 0.0606 K0.0922 0.0677 0.252**% 0.0834ln[HOUSE_Y] 9.034*** 0.589 9.346*** 0.743 11.81*** 0.874POV_R K0.244*** 0.0391 0.0677 0.0417 K0.0699 0.053BLACK_R K0.236*** 0.0171 K0.135*** 0.0162 K0.217*** 0.0193HISP_R K0.112*** 0.0224 K0.138*** 0.0228 K0.123*** 0.0296UNEMP_R K0.110* 0.0546 K0.0656 0.0557 K0.111 0.068EDUC_R 0.228*** 0.0401 0.176*** 0.0406 0.199*** 0.05ln[INST_PP] K2.161* 0.864 K0.825 0.96 K0.0862 1.131ln[CAP_PP] 0.0149 0.0858 0.291** 0.0902 0.312**% 0.115Year%2005 K4.735*** 0.425Year%2006 K4.291*** 0.424 K5.684*** 0.446 K23.53*** 0.529Year%2007 K3.921*** 0.394 0.619 0.4 K19.52*** 0.487Year%2008 K1.701*** 0.36 0.881* 0.376 K11.14*** 0.49Year%2009 K2.194*** 0.358 4.125*** 0.308 K2.290*** 0.437Year%2010 K0.463 0.35 3.115*** 0.308 K0.888*%% 0.442Year%2011 0.471 0.361 K1.377*** 0.292 0.0919 0.433Intercept K27.25*** 6.27 552.7*** 7.948 546.2*** 9.162Adj.%RKsq 0.59 0.611 0.689All%standard%errors%are%corrected%for%heteroskedasticity+%Significant%at%0.10*%Significant%at%0.05**%Significant%at%0.01***%Significant%at%0.001
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Table&4Time%and%District%Fixed%EffectsGRADRATE MEAN_ELA MEAN_MATHCoefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SEln[PROP_PP] B0.338 1.373 3.315+ 1.712 B3.640+%% 2.203ln[STATE_PP] 0.888 1.242 6.631*** 1.781 5.590**% 1.712ln[FED_PP] B0.322 0.439 B2.068*** 0.577 B1.270*%% 0.594ENROLL^2 0.0438** 0.0157 B0.0625** 0.023 B0.0360+%% 0.0217ENROLL B2.354* 1.056 1.137 1.426 0.579 1.393ln[HOUSE_Y] B3.741 2.868 B5.284 3.615 B4.046 3.289POV_R B0.165+ 0.0929 0.210* 0.0994 0.181+%% 0.107BLACK_R B0.0795 0.122 B0.25 0.17 B0.0411 0.17HISP_R 0.0668 0.0855 B0.17 0.141 B0.0793 0.132UNEMP_R 0.138 0.0934 0.0676 0.12 B0.0605 0.137EDUC_R B0.029 0.0956 0.0667 0.134 0.0625 0.135ln[INST_PP] B5.016* 2.262 B4.548 2.788 B1.035 2.913ln[CAP_PP] 0.143+ 0.0824 0.302** 0.0917 0.194+%% 0.105Year%2005 B5.672*** 0.827Year%2006 B5.061*** 0.707 B3.971*** 0.854 B22.72*** 0.917Year%2007 B4.503*** 0.56 1.729* 0.697 B19.13*** 0.73Year%2008 B2.191*** 0.469 1.097+ 0.586 B11.42*** 0.616Year%2009 B2.531*** 0.362 3.789*** 0.448 B2.819*** 0.487Year%2010 B1.167*** 0.309 2.885*** 0.337 B1.548*** 0.381Year%2011 B0.417 0.285 B1.787*** 0.258 B0.913**% 0.312Intercept 144.4*** 32.92 700.8*** 41.72 716.1*** 39.65Overall%RBsq 0.0007 0.0028 0.0678All%standard%errors%are%corrected%for%heteroskedasticity+%Significant%at%0.10*%Significant%at%0.05**%Significant%at%0.01***%Significant%at%0.001
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Table&5Random'EffectsGRADRATE MEAN_ELA MEAN_MATHCoefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SEln[PROP_PP] 2.003** 0.709 2.390** 0.758 0.373 1.056ln[STATE_PP] J1.496* 0.697 J2.376** 0.752 J2.641**' 0.941ln[FED_PP] J1.676*** 0.436 J3.612*** 0.551 J3.033*** 0.581ENROLL^2 0.0173*** 0.00438 J0.00802* 0.00389 J0.0268*** 0.00675ENROLL J0.811*** 0.136 0.104 0.126 0.553**' 0.184ln[HOUSE_Y] 8.944*** 1.096 9.283*** 1.187 12.29*** 1.443POV_R J0.252*** 0.0639 0.106 0.0653 0.0248 0.0828BLACK_R J0.271*** 0.0325 J0.169*** 0.031 J0.262*** 0.0401HISP_R J0.0939* 0.0413 J0.148*** 0.0445 J0.130*'' 0.0569UNEMP_R 0.0434 0.0746 J0.0299 0.0793 J0.104 0.101EDUC_R 0.154* 0.0699 0.190* 0.0753 0.218*'' 0.0878ln[INST_PP] J2.975* 1.378 J1.368 1.408 0.183 1.899ln[CAP_PP] 0.116 0.0815 0.320*** 0.0917 0.219*'' 0.105Year'2005 J4.744*** 0.511Year'2006 J4.256*** 0.457 J4.762*** 0.508 J22.35*** 0.552Year'2007 J3.823*** 0.384 1.304** 0.441 J18.64*** 0.467Year'2008 J1.505*** 0.313 1.331*** 0.394 J10.47*** 0.402Year'2009 J2.039*** 0.28 4.317*** 0.288 J1.845*** 0.327Year'2010 J0.632* 0.278 3.209*** 0.271 J0.808*'' 0.318Year'2011 0.0735 0.279 J1.442*** 0.241 J0.283 0.297Intercept J17.09 11.82 545.3*** 13.42 531.1*** 16.01Overall'RJsq 0.5872 0.6084 0.6863All'standard'errors'are'corrected'for'heteroskedasticity+'Significant'at'0.10*'Significant'at'0.05**'Significant'at'0.01***'Significant'at'0.001






	   	  
Table&6Random'Effects'excluding'expenditure'variablesGRADRATE MEAN_ELA MEAN_MATHCoefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SEln[PROP_PP] 1.128** 0.539 1.990** 0.599 0.457 0.754ln[STATE_PP] Q1.838* 0.682 Q2.472** 0.728 Q2.532**' 0.885ln[FED_PP] Q1.928*** 0.438 Q3.744*** 0.546 Q3.036*** 0.565ENROLL^2 0.0155*** 0.00421 Q0.00835* 0.00387 Q0.0263*** 0.00687ENROLL Q0.758*** 0.135 0.116 0.124 0.541**' 0.185ln[HOUSE_Y] 8.562*** 1.065 9.041*** 1.154 12.32*** 1.429POV_R Q0.262*** 0.0627 0.105 0.0639 0.0331 0.0815BLACK_R Q0.273*** 0.0327 Q0.172*** 0.0315 Q0.263*** 0.0404HISP_R Q0.106*** 0.0411 Q0.153*** 0.0444 Q0.131*'' 0.057UNEMP_R 0.0353 0.0741 Q0.037 0.0797 Q0.107 0.101EDUC_R 0.161* 0.0699 0.196* 0.0762 0.219*'' 0.0877Year'2005 Q4.363*** 0.467Year'2006 Q3.950*** 0.428 Q4.635*** 0.498 Q22.36*** 0.532Year'2007 Q3.598*** 0.361 1.372** 0.434 Q18.67*** 0.46Year'2008 Q1.331*** 0.3 1.471*** 0.392 Q10.42*** 0.392Year'2009 Q1.863*** 0.266 4.539*** 0.278 Q1.733*** 0.304Year'2010 Q0.480+ 0.265 3.447*** 0.263 Q0.670*'' 0.302Year'2011 0.201 0.276 Q1.306*** 0.235 Q0.288 0.288Intercept Q18.43 11.76 545.0*** 13.43 530.6*** 15.95Overall'RQsq 0.5863 0.6073 0.6858All'standard'errors'are'corrected'for'heteroskedasticity+'Significant'at'0.10*'Significant'at'0.05**'Significant'at'0.01***'Significant'at'0.001
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